

# AYIKÁ

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**JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND  
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# **AYIKA**

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*On behalf of the Editorial Board, thank you for the interest in Ayika.*

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**EDITORIAL POLICY**

AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA is a journal that provides an avenue to scholars, researchers, policy analysts, think tank groups, as well as the civil society community to ventilate the various ramifications of the relations between environment and politics and development in Africa. The causal relationship between the environment and politics and vice versa has grown such that the scientific and political communities have fundamentally and unprecedentedly come to agreement as to the cause(s) of environmental problems. Hence, there is a growing recognition of government as the consumer of scientific findings on the environment such as that this journal portends. This point, in many respect, led to the inauguration of this journal. It is as a consequence of addressing environmental governance issues from the global level right to the local and municipal levels across the world and with special interest on Africa's landscape that AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA was established.

Coupled with an ever-growing number of environmental movements and the broadening scope of environmental protection and environmental security advocacy and activism, the journal garners relevance. That is, a meaningful venture therefore to critically periscope the environment-politics nexus that this journal represents is because it appreciates the environment's complex realities in our modern world. The necessity of this journal too stems from many cases of resource-rich nations in Africa that have largely failed to translate their endowments into mass wealth and development, and thereby give rise to what scholars have tagged "resource curse" and/or affliction, to entrench sustainable environment in the continent.

Hitherto in the African continent, there has been recognised absence of much intellectual, academic and advocacy platforms upon which to discuss issues of environment-politics linkages in the continent in tandem with the rest of the world. While many existing academic mediums treat issues on the relationship between environment and politics as part of larger themes on

geography, agricultural science and the sciences generally, regrettably those in the humanities and social sciences have not fared better on this. It is for the reason of providing a platform for intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences alongside those in all other spheres of academic research that the Editorial Team purposefully pursued to ground **AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA**.

### **Vision/Mission Statement**

The vision and mission statements of *AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA* revolves around “Ayika”- a Yoruba word that refers to the environment. The linkage that the environment has to Africa’s socio-political development is no more under contestation. In fact, such a linkage is now established such that every discourse – be it an academic discussion and every other form of dialogue – notes the relationship between the environment and development in general. Thus, existing and emerging environmental problems are ever more political and now require political solutions more than ever. Whereas, the nature of the African continent is such that environmental problems are increasing and rising steadily and by the day, and in many cases, the negations are as a result of existing poor public infrastructure, disjointed socio-structural arrangements, lack of good policies and abysmal governmental investments in the continent’s environment sector. Therefore, *AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA* sets ultimately as its vision/mission statement the pursuit to bridge the gap of Africa’s underdevelopment emanating from her “Ayika”. This is given that new environmental problems such as climate change continues to impact on the daily lives of the African man and woman, yet mitigation and adaptation policies and strategies are chiefly nascent, ineffectual and in most cases poor. This journal, therefore, will aid to illuminate the views of scholars that argue that new environmental realities deemed developmental problems - as is the actual case in Africa- flow from political culture and politics that places very

weak emphasis on thorough and concrete conceptualisation of the environment-politics nexus for the continent's development.

### **Scope of the Journal**

“Ayika” means environment in Yoruba language of Nigeria. Hence, *AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA* is established to treat issues of environment in ways that will provide sound policy and socio-economic and political perspectives from scholars within and outside the African continent. Papers to feature in this journal may speak to the global dimension of environmental issues, but must have profound bearing on the African connection in terms of abating tremendously the environmental inducing underdevelopment variables in the continent. By implication, the journal will provide, and be, an avenue to proffer practical policy and political insights to Africa's most pressing and strategic environmental issues.

### **Aim of the Journal**

*AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA* is an environment politics journal in Africa that so much focuses on the African continent. It covers theoretical, policy, programmatic and other overarching dimensions and dynamics of environmental politics, governance and diplomacy in Africa. As a result of this, original review articles and every other kind of intellectual manuscript from academic fields cum disciplines such as philosophy, geography, international relations, economics, political science, sociology, psychology and related scholarly areas will be published in the journal.

### **House Style**

The journal is based on universal standards of presentation of papers for academic journal publication. That is, papers should be segmented and should begin with an Abstract. The Abstract should not exceed 300 words and should be in italics. The author(s) are at liberty to segment the body of

their papers according to a preference. Paper length will differ with every other publication based on the Editorial Team's designation. The Harvard and APA referencing styles are preferable amongst other referencing techniques. Author(s) will be provided with an email address where their paper(s) should be sent to every quarterly and the sending frame for papers should be in Word Format.

### **Issues**

This journal is published two times annually. Meaning that, each issue will be published once within six months of the year. The journal will be committed to global best practices in academic journal publication. There will be double blind review for every article submitted to this journal. Furthermore, the journal will be abstracted and indexed in the most authoritative databases in the globe such as EBSCO, ProQuest, J-Gate and Sabinet and accredited by IBSS and Scopus.

**EDITORIAL NOTE**

The linkage between environment and politics is a long-established one. Scholars, policymakers, analysts and other stakeholders have argued severally on this relationship. Existing and emerging environmental problems now require political solutions more than ever. The causal relationship between environment and politics and vice versa has grown such that the scientific and political communities have come to fundamental and unprecedented agreements as to the cause(s) of environmental problems. Hence, there is a growing recognition of government as the consumer of scientific findings on the environment. This has led to the establishment of environmental governance from the global level right to local and municipal levels across the world. This is coupled with an ever-growing number of environmental movements and broadening the scope of environmental advocacy and activism. Hence, environment-politics nexus represents one of the most complex realities of our modern world.

The nature of the African continent is such that environmental problems are rising steadily and in many cases are caused by a lack of good policies and investment in the environment. In some other cases, resource-rich nations in the continent have largely failed to translate their endowments into mass wealth and development, giving rise to what scholars have tagged resource curse and/or affliction. New environmental problems such as climate change continue to impact on the daily lives of the African man and woman, yet mitigation and adaptation policies and strategies are nascent and in most cases poor. While scholars have argued that new environmental realities be a developmental problem, in actual cases within the continent, the political class places very weak emphasis on this conceptualisation of environment.

AYIKA: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa has a mandate to extend the frontiers of knowledge on issues on the environment-politics complex and to be Africa's foremost environment and politics journal. It is therefore with profound happiness to bring out the first issue of the journal.

As a new journal, it intends to carve a niche for itself in the fields of political science, international relations, sociology, philosophy, law, environmental science and other relevant ones. Articles featuring in this inaugural issue of the AYIKA: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa have been made through standardised procedures of academic publications. In this wise, we want to place on record our appreciation of all that was involved in the making of the issue, the reviewers, contributors, and many others whose names we are denied by space to mention. It is our utmost believe that each article featuring in this inaugural issue of the journal will contribute to knowledge in the environmental politics of Africa.

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## **OIL MULTINATIONALS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST INSURGENCY IN THE NIGER DELTA OF NIGERIA**

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### **Abstract**

*Often times, the government, corporate bodies, the body of civil rights, non governmental organizations and individuals only talk about the devastating effects of the activities of the insurgents, without mentioning the root cause of insurgency. People don't bother to ask what could have been the cause of insurgency and how it can be resolved amicably. The insurgents are only tagged as terrorists. Nobody is born into this world with a mission to be a killer. Condition, sometimes can push people to behave like animals and even become cruel and wicked. Poverty can make people behave foolish and irascible. People who are fed up with life due to poverty and oppression are aggressive and they can do anything to gain attention. Instead of being subjective, the presenter tried in this paper to be objective in looking at the causes of insurgency and why it would be difficult for the government of Nigeria to stop insurgency. This paper takes a swipe at the causes of insurgency, the impact of insurgency on Nigeria and Nigerians, reasons why the fight against insurgency in Nigeria will remain unabated and the following recommendations were made as way out of this crisis and menace that has bedevil our nation, Nigeria: need for reorientation, need for education and poverty alleviation policies, the need for disarmament in Nigeria, prompt trial and prosecution of corrupt Nigerians, Provision of good arms for the military and the promotion and teaching of non violence in Nigeria.*

### **Introduction**

Insurgency is one major problem facing nations of the world especially in this twenty first century, and Nigeria is not exempted. Since the inception of

insurgency in the north eastern part of Nigeria in 2002, the Federal Government had made concerted and frantic efforts at completely dislodging this sect, but to no avail.

The government has spent billions of Naira on the fight against insurgency, yet it has not been able to bring insurgency to its knees. The prevalence of insurgency in Nigeria remains a great challenge confronting the government and the people today. What could be the reasons for the government's inability to crush the insurgents and also stop their activities? The aim of this paper therefore is to present some of the reasons why the fight against insurgency in Nigeria will remain unabated.

### **Causes of Insurgency**

Nigerian leaders keep people uneducated and the same uneducated people are the ones kidnapping and killing people everywhere. How is it not coming back to bite us? A large mass of our youths are very susceptible to brainwashing because nobody taught them better; they were never exposed to better education, so any fanatic can influence them (Lawal,2019). Their brain is plain canvas for anybody to program.

If you go to the northern part of Nigeria, you will see a very large number of uneducated, malnourished, ill-informed and hungry youths. They are like walking missiles and we keep complaining about insurgency. As long as there is manpower to be used, insurgency is not going to end.

Mohammed Yusuf founded the sect that became known as the Boko Haram insurgents in 2002 in Maiduguri, the capital of the north eastern state of Borno, establishing a religious complex with a school which attracted poor Muslim families from across Nigeria and neighboring countries. (Retrieved September 23, 2011 from <http://www.rickross.com/reference/islamic/islamic27.htm>). The centre had the political goal of creating an Islamic state, and became a recruiting ground for Jihadists. Having denounced the police and the state of corruption, Yusuf attracted followers from among unemployed youths.

Often times, people and the government keep on talking and talking about the activities of the Boko Haram sect without considering what must have led to the formation of this ruthless organization (sect). The insurgents are not mad people who just woke up one day and began to destroy lives and properties. Something must have provoked their actions.

People who are fed up with life are dangerous. The challenges of daily life, which governments have neglected for years, are affecting the people; even though the government has all the resources available to use in tackling the matter. Sometimes, the only way people can express their anger and displeasure over certain issues is for them to revolt. With what we see and hear during network news and in newspapers, Nigerians know that there had been no meaningful development in most states of Northern Nigeria. People who know their rights can do anything to take back what belongs to them. The insurgents may have gone to the extreme in their activities, but the simple truth is that they are only fighting for the liberation of the poor masses. Nigeria thrives on ignorance of the masses.

One may surmise, that the formation and the activities of the insurgents are the aftermath of bottled anger by some of the elites in the regions. In the Nigeria of today, it seems, we no longer have middle class citizens. We have only two classes of people: the extremely rich and the extremely poor. In this kind of atmosphere, insurgency is inevitable. One can make bold to say that deprivation and inequality are the primary causes of insurgency in Nigeria.

Other causes of insurgency, bothers on ideology, ethnic or linguistic difference, politico-socio economic reasons, fundamentalism and extremism. Boko Haram was founded as an indigenous group, turning itself into a Jihadist group in 2009(Cook, 2011). It proposes that interaction with the Western World should be forbidden.

In 2009, Yusuf, the then leader of the group, stated his belief that the concept of a spherical Earth is contrary to Islamic teaching and should be rejected, along with Darwinian evolution and the concept of rain origination from

water evaporated by the sun. Before his death, Yusuf reiterated the groups objective of changing the current education system and rejected democracy. In a nutshell, this presenter wishes to state that the insurgency in Nigeria is a product of frustration.

### **The Impact of Insurgency on Nigeria**

The impact of insurgency on security, the society, development and politics has been serious and complex. Some of the serious impact are as follows:

#### **i. Internal Displacement of Persons.**

The activities of the insurgents has led to the internally displacement of persons in three major states of north eastern Nigeria. The states include Bornu, Adamawa and Yobe. We have a lot of IDP's camps in North East Nigeria. Many have been killed, but those who survived the attacks from the insurgents have been settled in IDP camps where the Federal Government and NGO's are taking care of them.

#### **ii. Education of Children is Frequently Disrupted**

Many schools in areas of Boko Haram operations have been closed down due to attacks on these schools and their students. A good example is the attack on Chibok School girls. In April 2014, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 female students from Chibok, Bornu State.

#### **iii. Business in Many Parts of the Country have been Adversely Affected:**

Many businesses in Nigeria have collapsed due to Boko Haram activities. People who use to go to Bornu, Yobe, Benue and Adamawa for business can no longer travel to those areas for fear of been killed or kidnapped. This fear of killing and kidnapping, has also made many foreign expatriates and business men to relocate to other countries in Africa where insurgency is not too pronounced.

**iv. Funding of Security**

Large portions of Nigerian earnings and budget, now go to security. Money that was supposed to be used in developing other sectors such as education, road, agriculture, tourism e.t.c, is now been diverted to security. And this has affected the Nigerian economy adversely. Business and enterprises have failed because of frequent attacks by the insurgents.

**v. Loss of Lives and Properties**

Between 2009 and beginning of 2012, Boko Haram was responsible for over 900 deaths (Glenn, 2014). On 14 May 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in the States of Bornu, Yobe and Adamawa in a bid to fight the activities of the insurgents. In recent times, the insurgents have now put on the toga of herdsmen. In May 2018, 200 residents of Plateau state were massacred by suspected herdsmen.

In December 2010, there was a bombing in Jos (Plateau State) that saw 80 people dead followed by an attack on Abuja barracks. 2010-2011 was a year in which dozens of civilians were killed in various shootings that took place in Maiduguri and in addition, the Abuja Police Headquarters and the United Nations Headquarters. On the 19<sup>th</sup> of November, 2018, 70 soldiers of the Nigerian Army were killed in Bornu by the insurgents. Moreover, the nexus between some politicians and the insurgents has made elections a farce in some quarters

**Reasons Why the Multinational Fight Against Insurgency In Nigeria Will Remain Unabated.**

For anything that is happening, whether good or bad, there are always supporters (Obudu, 2018). To be frank, the fight against Insurgency in Nigeria will remain unabated because there are some prominent persons in Nigeria that are benefiting from the fight against insurgency. These persons include politicians, religious leaders, traditional leaders, the military and

NGO's. The following are some of the reasons why the fight against insurgency in Nigeria will remain unabated.

- i. **Corruption:** Corrupt government officials use the fight against insurgency as an opportunity to siphon government funds meant for the purchase of arms and ammunition. A case in point is that of Dasuki, who diverted funds meant for the purchase of arms during Jonathan's regime. During the regime of Obasanjo, the then Inspector General of Police, Tafawa Balogun was also discovered to have stolen more than Eighteen Billion Naira; money that was meant for the police commission. And he ended up being dismissed. Some government officials do not want the fight against insurgency to end, because it has become the conduit through which they steal government money.
- ii. **Economic Reasons:** The supply of fire arms is a very big business which runs into billions of Naira. Those who are into this business, supply the Federal Government as well as the insurgents arms. Since those who supply arms make a lot of profit, many even pray for the fight against insurgency to continue. It is even possible that nations which produce arms do not want the activities to come to an end so that they can continue exporting arms and make foreign earnings.
- iii. **Religious Bigotry:** Another reason why the fight against insurgency in Nigeria will remain unabated, is because, we have too many religious bigots in Nigeria who fan the ember of religious crisis. They say one thing today, and tomorrow, they say another thing. Religious bigots have strong, unreasonable beliefs about religion and would not want to listen to or accept the opinions of anyone who disagrees (Eshe, 2018)
- iv. **Poverty:** Poverty sometimes can make people to behave foolish and irascible. No rich man or a son of a rich man would want to risk his life living in Sambisa forest all in the name of Insurgency. Would the son or daughter of a former president or a business mogul be an insurgent? People who are fed up with life are aggressive and they can do anything

to gain attention. They will fight the authority if they are not given attention or when their needs are not met on time.

- v. **Tribal Sentiment:** It is all “Lip Service” when we say “Nigeria is one”. Nigeria has never been one and it can never be one. Even, the Hausas are saying that the Fulani’s do not like them. In a crisis situation, the Fulani’s can massacre the Hausas without any recourse. Tribal sentiment is one strong reason why the fight against insurgency cannot be stopped. The crisis in Jos, is political, religious and tribal in nature (John, 2008). The herdsmen/farmers clashes in Benue state, is both tribal and religious in nature. The typical Fulani man believes that Land does not belong to man; it belongs to God. So to them, nobody has the right to stop them from grazing on any land.
- vi. **Foreign Aid/Sponsorship:** In February 2012, an arrested insurgent revealed that while the organization (Boko Haram) initially relied on donations from members, its links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, opened it up to more funding from groups in Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom (Glenn, 2014). On May 2014, Boko Haram was officially declared a terrorist group affiliated to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb by the United Nations Security Council. International sanctions including asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo were imposed against the Islamist extremist group.
- vii. **Lack of Adequate Ammunition and Motivation**  
The Nigerian military is now a shadow of what it is reputed to have once been. It has fallen apart. They are short of basic equipment, including guns, radios and armored vehicles. The morale of our military is now very low. The insurgents are better armed and are better motivated than Nigerian troops. Given the present state of affairs, it is absolutely impossible for us to defeat Boko Haram (Ogidiagba 2018)

A Nigerian soldier who survived the deadly attack on a military base in the northern part of Borno State on Monday 19<sup>th</sup> November 2018, said, they suffered a heavy casualty figure due to lack of adequate weapons

(Vanguard, 2018). The fight did not last for more than 45 minutes, but it was bloody because the Boko Haram fighters had more armament advantage than the soldiers (Vanguard, 2018). Nigerian soldiers are being killed on a daily basis as if their lives don't matter. Of course as soldiers, they have signed to lay down their lives in defence of this country, but certainly not in the manner they are being presented for slaughter without dignity. The morale of the Nigerian military has been dampened so badly, not only because they are not given their due allowances, but for the fact that they have been out gunned by Boko Haram.

- viii. **Betrayal:** On May 2014, Nigerian Soldiers shot at the car of their divisional commander whom they suspected of colluding with Boko Haram and it was reported that nine Nigerian generals were being investigated for suspected sale of weapons to the insurgents (Guardian, 2014). One cannot deny the fact that most of the ambushes laid by the insurgents against the Nigeria army is as a result of information divulged by some unscrupulous elements within the military to the insurgents. On channel's Television on November 25, 2018, President Muhammadu Buhari, promised to correct the flaws within the military that has led to the killings of Nigerian soldiers
- ix. **The Fulfillment of Bible Prophecies**

While talking about the signs of the End of the Age, Jesus said in Matthew 24: 6-14

You will hear of wars and rumors of wars,  
but see to it that you are not alarmed.  
Such things must happen, but the end is  
still to come. Nation will rise against nation,  
and kingdom against kingdom. There will  
be famines and earthquakes in various places.  
All these are the beginning of birth pains.  
Because of the increase wickedness,  
the love of most will grow cold..... .And

this gospel of the kingdom will be preached  
in the whole world as a testimony to all  
nations, and then the end will come.

It is important for all and sundry to see the activities of the insurgents all over the world as part of the fulfillment of biblical prophecies. If it is part of Biblical prophecies, it therefore means that it will be difficult for any government or nation to totally annihilate the insurgents and their activities.

**x. The Porosity of Nigeria Borders**

The porosity of Nigeria Borders has led to the infiltration of the country by illegal immigrants from Chad, Mali, Niger and Senegal whose aim is to wreak havoc on the land. Most of the kidnappers and armed robbers terrorizing the Highways in Nigeria, are Fulanis from neighbouring countries.

**xi. Violence: The Only language African Leaders Understand**

The only language African leaders seem to understand, is the language of violence of which Nigerian Leaders are not excluded. Often times, our leaders do not listen to those who embark on peaceful protest or follow the path of dialogue. Peaceful protest, sometimes do not move our leaders to take the right action or step in tackling issues of national interest. For example, the Niger Delta youths have to start bombing and destroying oil pipelines before the Federal Government of Nigeria, saw the need to introduce the Amnesty Programme that brought relative peace to the region.

**Conclusion**

One cannot solve the problems of insecurity in a place like Nigeria where majority of people are poor and where people are not using the benefits of technology (Oboh, 2018). The foreign security personnels that came to Lagos after the killing of Funsho Williams some years back, could not do

anything. They had no CCTV to review activities around the scene of the crime. Those who ran this country ruined it. They made the people poor. The signature of poverty is everywhere. They placed money ahead of implementation of programmes. Even foreign powers are also acting as threat to Nigeria's internal security, by either committing or sponsoring terrorism or rebellion, without actually declaring war.

Nigerian Leaders over the years are prone to the habit of shielding the truth from their people, not caring as long as it does not happen in their time. They are actually very ignorant of what is going on round them, and are obstinate and tyrannical in their nature. The endless killings in the North Eastern part of the country in spite of the heavy presence of the military, have shown that security of person and properties is still far from being realizable.

Who are the people we voted for? What are their plans for the country? We keep recycling leaders and the worst part is that the world is advancing at the speed of sound and we are decades behind.

On different terrorist attacks, leaders with political will had something to say. On September 11, 2001 after the bombing of the World Trade Centre in the United States of America, George Bush said, "This is an act of war against the United States. We will hunt down the terrorists. They can run, but they can't hide. We will pursue peace by pursuing those who threaten it" (CNN news, 2001).

During the London bombing, Tony Blair said, "We will track down the terrorists and bring them to justice". However, in Nigeria, after the UN House bombing in 2011, Goodluck Jonathan said, "Terrorism is a global phenomenon, maybe it is Nigeria's turn". That shows the depth of intelligence and care of our leaders.

Security was a driving issue during the 2015 presidential campaigns following the unwater destruction of lives and properties by the insurgents in the Northern part of the country. President Muhammadu Buhari campaigned very hard to convince Nigerians that his government would

meet those security challenges. But the continuous killings by the Boko Haram sect in the North East after his election since 2015 has raised a lot of questions, which are still unanswered. At least over 2000 people have been killed since the President assumed office.

Presently, the Federal Government of Nigeria and the military, seems to be confused as a result of how the insurgents are defeating the Nigerian military. The Nigerian Army is in a helpless situation because they lack the morale and the armory to fight with the insurgents. This indeed is an aberration. It is for us to appreciate the fact that the nation is faced with a serious crisis that may consume everybody and therefore, we must find a way to solve the problem.

### **Recommendations**

The following recommendations are made:

1. **Need for re-orientation:** There is need for religious and social re-orientation. Ayuk(2012) submits that,

*The solution to end insurgency lies in the hands of our political and religious leaders. They must be able to call their followers to order and begin to preach the gospel of peace rather than violence. When violence becomes intense, it can lead to war which will ultimately result in suffering and undue loss of lives and properties (p.2)*

Politicians and religious leaders should re-orientate their followers on the need for peace and peaceful co-existence. They should feed the youths with the message of peace (Wariboko 2017). The governor of Niger State, Muazu Babaginda Aliyu, on the aftermath of the 2011 Christmas day bombing of a catholic church in Minna Niger State, advocated for religious reorientation and called on Muslim scholars to teach more on the subject of Jihad, asserting that the destruction of innocent lives and properties have nothing to do with the Islamic concept of Jihad. Religious leaders need to rise and emphasize peace which happens to be central in the major religions in Nigeria. It should reflect in practice, since all religions in Nigeria, teach peace.

## **2. Education and Poverty Alleviation Policies:**

According to Halliru (2012) as cited by Wariboko (2017), “lack of education or poor education is one of the major causes of crises in Nigeria. In 2012, some state governors and religious and political leaders, said, that the north east region of Nigeria has the greatest number of school dropouts (Wariboko, 2017). Therefore, some unscrupulous political and religious leaders gather these dropouts/almajiris and feed them with all sorts of information to motivate them to start up riots or even accept to become suicide bombers. These dropouts/almagiris believe them because of ignorance and perhaps, unemployment and poverty. It has been revealed that the north-east and north-west geopolitical zones have the greatest amount of poverty in Nigeria. This is why the incidence of ethno-religious riots and killings are more rampant in these areas (Wariboko, 2017). Hence, the establishment of free schools for the almagiris in the Northern region by Dr. Goodluck Jonathan’s administration is a right step in the right direction and should be applauded. However, more need to be done to educate them, create meaningful jobs for them and when their poverty and sense of worthlessness is alleviated; they will be less gullible and know that life is worth living and that other’s lives are also precious. Then they will be able to reason more critically and sensibly.

## **3. Disarmament:**

Disarmament is necessary in Nigeria presently so as to reduce the amount of arms in the possession of individuals. This will help to; at least reduce the effect of conflicts in future. The possession of arms have a way of boosting one’s confidence in times of violence, therefore, the absence of it will serve as a deterrent to bloody and perilous conflicts.

## **4. Prompt trial and prosecution of culprits:**

Special courts should be established for trying suspected terrorists, and perpetrators of all kinds of violent conflict. This will accelerate hearings and

curb unnecessary delay in trying suspects and the prosecution of those found guilty. Justice delayed, they say is justice denied. When legal actions are expedited and culprits punished as soon as possible, others will be deterred from committing such crimes and there will be little or no room for the intervention or interference of “godfathers” on behalf of those found guilty

#### **5. Provision of good Arms for the Military:**

Adequate arms should be given to the Nigerian Army. This would enable them to fight and crush the insurgents. Basic equipments such as guns, radios and armoured vehicles and war planes should be supplied to the military to enable them defend the nation and her people. Nigerian soldiers have been suffering defeat in the hands of Boko Haram insurgents due to lack of adequate weapons

#### **6. Culture of Non-Violence:**

Political and religious leaders in Nigeria should be unequivocal about their abhorrence of it. Non violence remains an indispensable tool whenever it has to do with conflicts and settling of differences so as to give peace` a chance (Wariboko, 2011). Violence and conflict will not take this country anywhere. Nigerian should learn to imbibe the culture of nonviolence. Hence religious or civil war should never be considered as an option in Nigeria, rather tactful and meticulous non violent steps should be taken to stop such despicable acts and restore tranquility in Nigeria.

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### List of interviewees

S/N	NAMES	OCCUPATION	AGE	SEX	PLACE	DATE
1.	Eshe, P	Lecturer	52	M	Warri	6/7/2018
2.	Augoye, J	Civil servant	41	M	Ugbokodo	9/8/2018
3.	Obudu, T.	Clergy	54	M	Effurun	12/8/2018
4.	Ogidiagba, B	Lecturer	56	M	Warri	10/11/2018
5.	Oboh, Alfred	Engineer	40	M	Ugbokodo	9/8/2018

**Terrorism financing as a threat to national Security and Development  
in Africa- The Nigeria scenario**

**Friday E. Nkwede<sup>1</sup>; Leonard C; Uguru<sup>2</sup>, BigBen C. Ogbonna<sup>3</sup>;**

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**Abstract**

*This paper investigates the cause of terrorism financing and its impact on development in Africa with focus on Nigeria. There exists a notion among terrorist that they can conquer and control the world from their own perspective. The notion calls for more power by the so-called terrorist organisations. The interrogation of this paper is: who is financing this organization and how? From this premise and using descriptive phenomenological method and review approach, the paper discovered that the two most viable sources of terrorism financing in Nigeria and Africa are the state-led-sponsorship and the private-led-sponsorship. Again, the study also affirms that illegitimate and illegal sources of finances to terrorist constitute substantial modus operandi of terrorist fund raising strategies. The paper conclude that the national and economic developments in Nigeria and Africa are seemingly compromised. The challenges of insecurity and national development have become an unholy marriage of inconveniences. Thus, the paper strongly recommends stopping the money from entering into the cell of a terrorist as one of the best approaches in fighting terrorism in Africa.*

**Keywords:** *Terrorism, Finance, Human Security, Economy, National development, Nigeria*

**Introduction**

Today, terrorism financing has remained a major security threat to national peace in Africa. The act of financing terrorist groups in Africa constitutes the greatest defy of terrorism halt in the African continent. In this day and age, the supreme exchange of blows of political, economic and national developments in Africa is the pervasive widespread of a terrorist group in the region. Unarguably, terrorism financing cum terrorist attacks remain the greatest human security threats and a foremost threat to national development in Africa. At the center of this human security threats, brutality and inhumanity to humanity in Africa are the combined ill activities of terrorist groups, insurgency, religious crisis, political crisis, armed conflict, and land-related war. Terrorism is the worst of all. The frequency and the nature of terrorist attacks in Africa are clear evidence of the increasing security threats and increased sophistication of the terrorist monsters.

Execution of terrorist attack is expensive, hence the reason for adequate financing. For instance, the terrorist attack of the World Trade Center and Pentagon 2011 in America cost \$303,672 - \$500,00 to execute; the Embassy bombing in Kenya cost \$50,000. Again, according to an estimate by the national terrorist financial investigation unit of the New Scotland Yard, UK, the subway bombings in London, cost \$12,543 and the bombings of the Nightclubs, Bali, Indonesia by terrorist groups also cost \$50,000. More so, see table 1. Other scholars argue that it does not matter the huge amount of money involved in executing terrorist attacks, since the actual amount of money involved in their operation can be relatively small but the dangerous impact of the attack can be huge and unbearable (Acharya, 2009, Carbonara, 2001 and Pieth, 2006).

**Table 1: Terrorist attacks and cost involved**

S/N	Major terrorist attacks	Date	The cost involved (est)
1	Bishopsgate Church Bombing London the UK	April 1993	\$5,500
2	Embassies bombings Tanzania & Kenya	1998	\$50,000
3	USS Cole attack, Yemen	October 12/2000	\$10,000
4	World Trade Centre and Pentagon, USA	Sep. 11/2001	\$303672-500000
5	Bombings of Night Club, Bali, Indonesia	Oct. 12/2002	\$50,000
6	J.N.Mariot Hotel Bombing, Indonesia	Aug. 5/2003	\$30,000
7	Truck-bomb attacks, Istanbul, Turkey	Nov.15&20, 2003	\$40,000
8	Train bombing, Madrid, Spain	March 11/2004	\$10,000
9	Subway bombings, London, UK	July 7/2005	\$12,543
10	UN House bombing, Abuja, Nigeria	2012	\$13,000
11	Eagle square bombing, Abuja, Nigeria		\$10,000

**Source:** Acharya, 2009, with modification by the authors

The global perception of terrorism financing is the view that small amount brings big bash. With such perception, any amount of money prevented from entering the cell of the terrorist group becomes significant. The post-September 2001 bombing initiative with the objective of terrorism financing submits that the strategy of going after the money for the purpose to weaken the operational capacity of terrorist has remained on course.

Thence, the purpose of this study is to delineate and illustrate the ill practice of funding terrorist attack and terrorist organization. In the views of the World Bank and IMF (2006), terrorism financing is described as “the financial support in any form of terrorism or those who encourage, plan or engage in it”. On a general note, the act of financing terrorism begins with legitimate money usually with legitimate sources. It moves from this legitimate process to the hands of terrorist to sustain their infrastructure and fund attacks (Simser, 2011). Terrorism financing has many motivations but peace is not one of them. Over the years, many attempts have been made to investigate the scope of terrorism financing because of the huge amount of

money usually spent in one attack by terrorist groups (Schott, 2006; Biagioli, 2008; Zdanowicz, 2009; Walker and Unger, 2009; Unger *et al*, 2006 and Unger 2007).

In addition to the economic losses through the financing of terrorist groups, many lives and property have been destroyed in Nigeria and Africa in general. For instance, Mavin (2008) cited in Simser (2011) reported that about 200 million people working and living outside their home together in one place could be world's fourth most populous country are displaced by a terrorist. The lethal killings and destruction of property no doubt have negatively and adversely affected National development in Africa. In Nigeria and other parts of African countries, many business investments have collapsed, just as many foreign investors have withdrawn their investment. The national government attentions have been diverted to the insecurity challenges. As a matter of fact, national development, economic progress, and national peace are perhaps compromised. It is against this background that this study is motivated to investigate the sources, the types and methods of terrorism financing in Africa with special attention to Nigeria as a reference point. To be able to understand the terrorism financing, the paper will highlight some causes of terrorism which are appetizers to its financing.

### **Some causes of terrorism**

According to Krieger & Meierrieks (2011:6), economic frustrations create a space for terrorism activities because the poor tend to be frustrated because of being excluded from economic stature of the communities they live in, thence they are easy targets for recruitment to fight the government of the day. They are promised a better life. Political vacuum and instability contribute to the establishment of terrorism because when leadership is lacking, there is a possibility of someone taking over and that space is utilised by terror groups to create a security and a sense of militancy to fight the weak government.

Kreiger and Meierrieks (2011:8) further highlight that unfair practices or oppression can contribute to terrorism. This is exacerbated by the globalisation which tends to change people's identity and impose new identity and worldview. This is viewed as oppression and terrorism want to liberate people from the slavery of the minds and give them the freedom to live the way they wish. Kreiger and Meierrieks argues that;

If individuals are incited by an existing global order that is perceived as 'unfair', it should be easier for terrorist organizations to find support by building on related grievances in the source countries of terrorism. However, the targets of terrorism may also be chosen in response to the existing global order, especially if this order is perceived as 'unjust' from the perpetrators' perspective. For instance, a conflict between a government and an opposing group may be exported to a foreign ally of the government. Terrorism may also be used as a foreign policy tool to fight antagonistic worldviews, e.g., as observed during the Cold War.

Religion is another factor that causes terrorism. There exist a tendency that people who are leaders or claim to be leaders want to follow and they prefer total obedience and that necessitates that their followers follow a strict pattern. That pattern is enforced by religion. Zalman (2018) refers to the 1990 when there was a number of attacks in the name of religion. He refers to the Islamic martyrs. Career terrorism experts began to argue that a new form of terrorism was on the rise, with concepts such as martyrdom and Armageddon seen as particularly dangerous. However, as thoughtful studies and commentators have repeatedly pointed out, such groups selectively interpret and exploit religious concepts and texts to support terrorism. Religions themselves do not "cause" terrorism.

From the cases mentioned the paper is opinionated that in order to wage such a war or such an initiative one needs finance. The other factor which is evident in the causes is the take-over and the mental indoctrination by exploiting the poor, marginalized who are eager to have leadership. But due

to that vacuum, terrorism invades the space and install itself as a legitimate liberator. To sustain the takeover and to implement it one needs finance and alibis thence terrorism is being financed.

### **The concept of terrorism financing**

Most of the attempts in the conceptualization of terrorism financing are deeply connected to the terrorism. In its simplest form, Financial Action Task Force(2015) opines that terrorism financing “involves the financing of terroristactivities and of a terrorist organization.” Additionally, Fidis (2004) argues that terrorism financing refers to “processing of funds to sponsor or facilitate terrorist activity.”

In an attempt to factually link terrorism with terrorism financing due to its twin nature, Richard Belts, the director of the Institute of war and peace studies, Columbia University raised the following questions: “everyone uses the term terrorism, but who really understand it? What is precisely terrorism? What causes it? Who engages in it? Should terrorists be identified according to intentions, ideologies, tactics or targets? When is violence justified so that it is not terrorism? How can one distinguish morally culpable terrorists from legitimate guerillas, insurgents, counter-terrorists, or freedom fighters? Does terrorism include threats of violence as well as actual acts of violence? What is it to be an innocent victim of terrorism? Is it rational to speak of the human terrorism against the animal world? Does terrorism involve a sudden, singular, direct dramatic action such as a bomb strike or can it also include an economic or political policy that unfolds slowly, indirectly, yet devastating? Can there be terrorism against ministry target or only against civilian and noncombatants? In the same attempt to link terrorism with terrorism financing, the UN convention for the suppression of the financing terrorism, article 2 posits that:

Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this convention if that person by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and willfully, provides or collects funds with the intention that they should

be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used in full or in parts, in order to carry out (a) An act which constitutes an offense within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex; or (b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.

The above similitude makes a broad link between terrorism financing with terrorism. In this line of thought, UN convention of 1994, further state terrorism is an act of “criminal acts intended to provoke a state of terrorism in the general public, a group of persons or persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of a political philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them”. Although, the UN member states have not yet agreed upon the general definition of terrorism itself, due to its multifaceted nature, and this fact has remained a big obstacle to meaningful international countermeasures to terrorism financing; the terminological consensus on terrorism even though necessary for single comprehensive convention on terrorism but is not the primary goal of this study. However, reference is made to it for the purpose of superior appreciation of the concept of terrorism financing.

Consequently, with reference to the definition of terrorism financing offered, it is factual to point out that terrorists and or terrorist groups as an organized criminal association maintain and build litany of organs and infrastructure to facilitate the development of fundraising and channels of sources of funding to the financiers. The illegal means of terrorism financing usually result in terrorist financiers to disguise the illegal funds so as to protect organizations responsible for such sponsorship. It is these extraordinary arrangements in terrorism financing that make it somewhat different from the traditional money laundering from the financial intelligent or investigation point of view.

## **Terrorism Financing Sources and Typologies**

There is no contradiction in the extant literature on the consensus that terrorist groups strive by every standard to ensure that their financial needs and requirements are met. Though terrorists have diverse sources of finance, the sources depend on the type and ideology of the groups, capacity, and capabilities, opportunities at their disposal and the nature of resources involved or needed. The sources of terrorism financing present itself in two dimensions. From the pedagogical inquiries, it is argued whether state-led terrorism financing is the leading financiers or the private-led sponsorship is the leading financial sponsors. On whether it is state-led sponsorship or private-led sponsorship, Banktekas and Nush (2007) argue that terrorist and terrorist financiers source their funds through both legitimate and illegitimate means.

Outside the two major lead sponsors of terrorism, terrorist also sources their funds from other sources depending on the type of terrorist group and the opportunities before them. For instance, other sources of terrorist financing are:

(a) Self-financing (b) Individuals and Companies (c) Donations (d) Nongovernment organizations and charity based organization (e) Investment and legitimate businesses.

**(a) Self-financing:** Terrorist can source funds through the means of compulsory levy that may be imposed by the group on themselves. This form of finance comes from individual members' contribution to the group. They can also source fund through self-financing by soliciting fund from the parent organ of the group who serves as the general oversea of the affairs and activities of the small terrorist groups-operating at the country level.

**(b) Donations:** Donations are a substantial source of finance to terrorist groups all over the world. According to Victori (2011:38), 'donations to terrorist groups come from wealthy individual donors and it is the commonest means of terrorism funding'. The donors often directly make

“huge sums” of money to terrorist. Some of the individual donors generously donate the money due to religious affiliations or obligations while some are international Diasporas donor. Most of the direct or indirect donors provide the funds to the terrorist group for various motives and purpose. According to Financial Action Task Force (2008: 11), ‘terrorist donated funds are usually collected through charity organizations that have a global presence that provides a framework for international operations’. These charities are not usually subjected to stringent regulation by financial institutions because they enjoy public trust.

Terrorist groups abuse charity organization. For instance, the terrorist organization uses charity based organization such as “Sham charity” to perpetrate frauds against donors to raise funds in disguise and in some case diverts funds from huge donation in the guise of humanitarian services. For example, according to the Financial Action Task Force (2008), “the Chief Executive Officer of the Benevolence International Foundation, an Illinois-based charity based in the United States of America was convicted of diverting of US\$315,000 of charitable donations to terrorist groups.

**(c) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs):** Some NGO can also be a veritable source of terrorism financing because they provide facilitates for a terrorist to strive in fundraising. Such facilities according to Victori (2011) include shippingaddress, housing, employment; identity cards recognized the location in a particular state. An example of NGOs as a source of funding was emphatically noticed by the confession of a member of Al-Qaeda who admitted that he “received identification cards from the Kenya-based Mercy International Relief Organization as they plotted the 1998 embassy bombings” (Stern, 2003: 273). Another example of where NGOs can facilitate terrorist fundraising is through NGOs bank accounts and by means of collecting funds and transferring such money to any part of the world where they are required by the terrorist groups. Thus, the non-governmental organization performscurtail functions as the source of terrorism financing in Africa.

**(d) Investment in business:** Additionally, some terrorist usually engages in legitimate business for the purpose of raising funds for terrorist activities. Due to the complex nature of business ventures, the terrorist would start up domestic business and use the proceeds of the business for terrorism financing. Terrorist groups can also legitimately “invest in stocks, bonds, real estate, construction companies, honey shops, tanneries, banks, agricultural commodity growers and brokers, trade business, bakeries, restaurants and bookstores” (Tofangsza, 2015:116). For instance, evidence abounds where a notorious and international acclaimed terrorist group such as Al-Qaeda invested in many businesses like the ‘real estate, wood, and paper industries in Norway and hospital equipment in Sweden’ among others (JaCquard, 2002: 128).

In such business, the terrorist groups keep on investing in the business because it gives a wide link to front line companies that perhaps provide them with international facilities and access to bank account and official postal address. Again, such investment offers protection to the terrorist in the “purchase and acquisition of explosive and chemical” required for terrorist attacks (Reeve, 1999: 178).

All these sources discussed above are legitimate sources of funds to the terrorist group. The illegitimate or illegal sources of finances to terrorist groups are drug trafficking, narcotics, organized crimes, extortion and intimidations, kidnapping, robbery, contraband cigarettes, counterfeit, frauds, smuggling, racketeering, drug, and arms trafficking, among others.

Amongst all, drug and arms trafficking is the most attractive and lucrative illegal sources of financing terrorist groups. The drug trafficking is a phenomenon called “Narcoterrorism” and it means the act of illegal business of cultivating, refining and distribution of narcotic drugs to various part of the world (Vittori 2011).

According to Berry and Library of Congress (2002), the Revolutionary Armed Force of Colombia, the Peruvian Shining Path, Taliban, Al-Qaeda

and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is the major user of the drug as the major source of terrorist financing. Additionally, in 2007 alone, it was reported that Afghanistan exported drug valued at USD 4 billion among insurgents, warlords and drug traffickers (Vittori, 2011: 36). Specifically, at the moment, the current illegal wave of terrorist finance in the West is through Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs). See as well appendix 5.

In addition to the various terrorism sources discussed above, other typologies of terrorism financing are:

- i. Terrorist financing through begging: this is done by arms collection by the vulnerable person sent by the terrorist groups.
- ii. Terrorist financing through extortion by means of intimidation.
- iii. Terrorist financing through execution of works by construction companies.
- iv. Terrorist financing through Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs).
- v. Terrorist financing through alternative transfer system, particularly *hawala*. See appendix 6 for *hawala* transactions.

### **Transcript of terrorist attacks in Africa and its consequences on National development**

As earlier stated in this paper, the number of people displaced globally by terrorist attacks apart from the number of persons killed is equivalent to the fourth most populous country in the world. From the global point of view, Iraq is the world leader in terrorism attacks with 10.00 score according to the 2015 global terrorism index (GTI). The terrorist group operating in Iraq is called ISIL, the second most deadly terrorist after Boko Haram. It is alarming that over a decade, the world (Africa inclusive) has remained fixated over the rising threats of the Islamic State (ISIL) “the richest and the most violent terrorist group in the modern history” (Liang, 2015); gathering its extremist fighters from around the globe to support its goal of establishing a “lasting and expanding caliphate. ISIL has eclipsed all other terrorist groups on the

world stage by transforming terror from a regional to global security threats. ISIL is regarded as ISIS or Daesh or the Islamic state.

The number of killings attributed to ISIL in Iraq alone is highest ever recorded in the single country. ISIL has over 9,929 deaths records and an average annual increase of 55% deaths records (GTI, 2015). This is followed by Afghanistan with 9.233 scores of global terrorism index from the same global point of view.

In Africa, Nigeria is leading interterrorist attacks and incidents. In the global ranking, Nigeria is ranked 3<sup>rd</sup> after Iraq and Afghanistan in first and second position respectively while Nigeria is ranked first in African context with 9.213 GTI score. Nigeria is greatly afflicted from terrorism devastation. Nigeria hosts the most deadly terrorist groups in the world since 2014 when Boko Haram made their highest killing in Nigeria and other African countries; such Cameroon and Chad where they operate. Boko Haram has recorded 453 attacks, killing 6,644 persons as at 2015. Boko Haram has also injured a total 1,742 person within the period under review. Boko Haram group is also known as Jama'at Ahlas-Sunnah had-Da'wah wa'l-Jihad and recently it is recognized as Islamic State's West African Province (ISWAP). The escalated killings of the group became massive when the leader of the group Mohammad Yusuf declared violence campaign in Nigeria in 2009.

In 2010, the new leader of the group Abubaka Shekau declared jihad against the Nigerian government and the United States. Since then, Boko Haram has been struggling to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria and other African countries. To achieve their goal, Boko Haram has strongly integrated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Again they have also more currently interacted heavily with ISIL in military training, funding, and mechanism because in 2015 Boko Haram official pledged loyalty and allegiance to ISIL as they reorganized the leader- al-Baghdadi as their Caliph of Muslims. Since then, it became bad news as they doubled their attacks and number of killings in West Africa. After these mergers, bombing increased in three-fold in Nigeria and Africa. Surface it to say that between January 3<sup>rd</sup>

to January 7<sup>th</sup>, 2015, Boko Haram as reported by GTI killed 2000 people in one town-Baga in Borno State, in the Northeast part of Nigeria alone.

Still, within Africa, Somalia is ranking second in Africa, because of lethality of killings by Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is as strong as Boko Haram in Nigeria. They are operating in three African countries namely – Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya just as Boko Haram is operating in three countries. Al-Shabaab as at 2015 has conducted over 496 attacks, killing 1021 person and left 850 people injured (GTI, 2015). The Al-Shabaab groups have vowed to create an Islamic state in Somalia. Al-Shabaab also was known as Harakat al-Shabaabal-Mujahideen is an al-Qa'eda loyalist with a home base in Djibouti town in Somalia. The biggest attack of Al-Shabaab as at 2015 was the paramilitary group-Raskamboni movement and the military forces of Jubaland which killed 91 persons and the 70 separate kidnapping/hostage attacks which resulted in 238 deaths.

Additionally, the Fulani militants as a terrorist group have conducted 154 attacks and killing 1229 person within Nigeria and the Central African Republic. This group has also injured over 395 people in addition to people displaced from their homes. As a terrorist group, Fulani-militants presence is clearly seen in seven Africa countries and their tribe comprises over 20 million people in Africa. In 2014 alone, Fulani militant is reported to have killed 1229 people with most of their attacks in six states in Nigeria. The Fulani militants' attack mostly targets farmer communities.

Though, the transcript of terrorist attacks and incidents is synoptic in this paper; it shows that out of five most deadly terrorist groups in the world, Africa alone hosts three and out this three, Nigeria hosts two. Therefore, these terrorist groups operating in African countries have currently put Africa in red alert as the terrorist desolate continent. See table 2 for a briefoverview of the African country's terrorism ranking outlook. Again, the African ranking can be easily compared with the global ranking in the appendix which shows Iraq as the world leader in terrorism.

**Table 2: African Country Ranking in Terrorism Attack**

Rank	Country	Score	Rank	Country	Score	Rank	Country	Score
1	Nigeria	<b>9.213</b>	18	Ethiopia	<b>3.544</b>	33	Republic of Congo	<b>0.823</b>
2	Somalia	<b>7.6</b>	19	Niger	<b>3.485</b>	34	Burkina Fasco	<b>0.305</b>
3	Libya	<b>7.29</b>	20	Senegal	<b>3.467</b>	35	Mauritania	<b>0.305</b>
4	Egypt	<b>6.813</b>	21	Burundi	<b>3.342</b>	36	Angola	<b>0.243</b>
5	Central African	<b>6.721</b>	22	Rwanda	<b>3.334</b>	37	Guinea – Bissau	<b>0.153</b>
6	South Sudan	<b>6.712</b>	23	Cote d’ivoire	<b>3.141</b>	38	Benin	<b>0</b>
7	Sudan	<b>6.662</b>	24	Djibouti	<b>2.567</b>	38	Gabon	<b>0</b>
8	Kenya	<b>6.66</b>	25	Madagascar	<b>2.444</b>	38	The Gambia	<b>0</b>
9	Dem. Rep. of Congo	<b>6.487</b>	26	Chad	<b>2.142</b>	38	Equatorial Guinea	<b>0</b>
10	Cameroon	<b>6.466</b>	27	Zimbabwe	<b>1.71</b>	38	Mauritius	<b>0</b>
11	Mali	<b>5.871</b>	28	Eritrea	<b>1.636</b>	38	Malawi	<b>0</b>
12	Uganda	<b>54.894</b>	29	Morocco	<b>1.446</b>	38	Namibia	<b>0</b>
13	Algeria	<b>4.75</b>	30	Ghana	<b>1.381</b>	38	Papua New Guinea	<b>0</b>
14	Mozambique	<b>4.386</b>	31	Liberia	<b>1.219</b>	38	Sierra Leone	<b>0</b>
15	South Africa	<b>4.21</b>	32	Guinea	<b>1.187</b>	38	Swaziland	<b>0</b>
16	Tanzania	<b>3.979</b>						
17	Tunisia	<b>3.697</b>						

*Source: Extracted by the authors from the Global Terrorism Index Report 2015. See Appendix 3.*

In the light of the above, the national development in Africa is seemingly compromised in the altar of terror. It has affected not only the national unity and peace but the very fabrics of the continent's economic growth and development. Most of the human and material resources in the continent are forcefully channeled to the burning battle between the terrorist groups and the military to an extent that national development is almost abandoned. For instance, in Somalia, the terrorist groups have forced the sovereign of the state out of the capital base-leading to the gradual relation of Somalia sit of authority to a nearby country, from where the government Somalia is run. In Nigerian case, for instance, most of the states in the Northwest part the country have fully devoted her full attention to the cause of getting the lasting solution for the lingering unity crisis in the zone. Maintenance of internally displaced persons who have turned refugee in their own country is a huge burden on the government. As a matter of fact, national development is negatively affected.

### **Funding at different levels and funding necessity of terrorist group**

Terrorist groups at different levels have various funding needs. The funding necessity of terrorist groups whether local-based or international-based terrorist is inevitable. A terrorist needs money/funds to finance local cells and carry out terrorist attacks. At different levels, terrorist groups require money to maintain networks of supports, communications, training facilities and "most importantly to underwrite the cost of local conflicts as al-Qaeda was doing in the Middle East, the South and Southeast Asia and in the Horn of Africa (Acharya, 2009). The basic different funding levels that have formed funding necessity for terrorist groups are as follows:

### **Training and organization of groups**

Terrorist groups need fund for the training of members. This is done for the establishment and organization of the groups. The need for funding in this respect is because of "command and control structure" of the terrorist organization. Gunaratna (2002) has noted, "how while in Afghanistan, Al-

Qaeda had an elaborate organizational structure with a number of committee and councils responsible for different aspects of the group's activities." Apart from the similar strong structure financed and maintained by Osama bin Laden in Sudan, when he returned to Afghanistan; the same kind of expensive network of training camps was set up by Al-Qaeda, funded and maintained with highly organized and administrative structures.

The kind of the structure requires a huge sum of money for funding at different levels. In fact, funding necessity of the terrorist groups is second to none with respect to the kind of terror architecture usually maintained by the terrorists. For instance, Gunaratna and Acharya (2005) argue that most of the training camps of terrorist groups are in the form of terror University because it spans a number of well-equipped facilities where hundreds of thousands of terrorist from all parts of the world gather to receive training with wide range of skill for both simple and complex operational techniques. Al-Qaeda as a terrorist organization operated a chemical laboratory in one of its training camps and boldly invited paid specialist and scientist to run the criminal weapon programming aspect of the laboratory. Members were also trained with high records of expenditure and paid nominal salaries. According to Defense Intelligence Agency(2002), the Al-Qaeda constitutional charter provides that the salary for a married Mujahideen was 6500 Pakistan rupees and 500 rupees for each child, while an unmarried Mujahideen goes home with 1000 rupees. Therefore, the organizational formation and training no doubt form their funding necessity at different levels of the organization.

### **Safe haven**

Terrorist groups need huge amount of money to pay for their protection and asylum. The payment for protection is their safe heaven bills. In spite of the nature of their devilish activities, they need protection. Sudan received huge financial support from Osama and his group to protect them as the host state. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda rented guest houses for the training camp of some of their large network for training and recruitment needs. The

Taliban who promised protection to them were regularly paid by the terrorist groups with a huge amount of money. Roth *et al* (2004) reported that over time, the Taliban gradually became financially dependent on the terrorist group and increased their financial demands for armaments and the Taliban's social welfare projects. The Center for Intelligence Agency estimated the money released to the Taliban to the tune of \$30 million annually.

### **Social and political activities**

Terrorist groups need money for social activities such as providing support to the families of individual members killed in the cause of their operations/attacks or suicide operations. The group provides the support for the overall interest of the group as a community and to avoid the decline of the group's activities. In this regards too, money is needed by terrorist to cater for the group members deployed as sleepers (ie "operatives who live to undercover and do not support their dependent" (Ehrenfeld, 2005). Again, terrorist also provides support to political activities to gain popular support. This kind of political support goes with huge financial demands on the part of the services including propaganda and ostensible legitimate social activities to provide a veil of legitimacy for the activities (Her Majesty's Treasury, 2007).

### **Propaganda Communication**

Every terrorist group requires money for propaganda production. The propaganda comes in the form of electronic communications via television, radio, videos and print media. Terrorist groups spend money on propaganda and communications because it helps them to reach out to their allied groups, like-mind and through this means entice potential members. The propaganda and communication techniques of terrorist groups are an essential aspect of terrorist activities. Acharya (2009: 290) notes that:

*Terrorist groups continuously seek ways and means to achieve sophistication and professionalism in their propaganda methods. Professionalism in the use of the internet by the jihadi*

*groups encompasses the technology and the quality of content of audios, videos, and online magazines, produced by the Islamists and posted on various websites. This requires new software for data management and internet security for effective use of the panoply of web resources like chat rooms, forums, and blogs. The production of jihadi audiotapes and video recordings are also increasingly corporate-like. For example, most of the statements in the audio-visual format being issued by top-ranking Al-Qaeda leaders and videos of significant attacks in Afghanistan are being produced by “As-Sahab,” a production company affiliated to Al-Qaeda. Most web-postings, especially videos, now carry subtitles in many languages, including English. This is to rope in second, and third-generation Muslims who are born and brought up in English-speaking countries, especially in the UK and North America.*

### **Multiple operations in diverse locations**

Among the terrorist, it takes huge financial resources to conduct multiple attacks or operation in different locations in the world. Financing of multiple operations is usually transactional because money is raised in one country as the base; this fund is used for training in country B, perhaps procurement is made in country C and the terrorist attacks in country D, with outcome of such operation broadcast via propaganda across the world to showcase their ability (Treasury, 2007). Therefore, funding comes from different levels according to the funding necessity of the groups. According to Acharya (2009) “mounting attacks in a foreign jurisdiction or supporting the same by an affiliated group is likely to be more expensive than conducting attacks in a domestic one”. On the issue of multiple operations’ funding Al-Qaeda remains the world principle actor.

### **Methods of moving terrorist funds in Africa**

According to The Financial Action Task Force (2015), money used by terrorist moves from one hand to the terrorist hand or cell which in turn is

used by terrorist for their attacks. From the encompass literature, it is highlighted that terrorist move and store money through three methods namely-through formal and informal financial system, through physical movement of funds and value and through the international trade system.

a.) *Financial system:* Punder (2010) strongly argues that the formal financial system is the most “attractive channel for the financing of terrorism due to the provision of services and products by which funds can be transferred efficiently and effectively between and within the jurisdiction”. The formal financial system helps the terrorist financiers and terrorist to make the dirty money available via the financial institutions. Through this means and method, the value or the money moves with speed and ease. This institution can provide cover and in some cases conceal the origin of such fund.

In addition to the formal means, the informal means is developed for informal transfer of value for the same purpose of financing terror. This informal method according to ViHori (2011) is referred to as trust-based mechanism, a method of informal value and money transfer in which money is ensured to be transferred to another geographic location by using a series of informal and often unlicensed money exchangers. This type of informal mechanism is very rampant in many parts of Africa, South Asia, the Middle East and other parts of the world. Their common names are hundi in India, fei chi ien in China, phoe Kuah in Thailand and hawala in Muslim countries. These informal means of storing, moving and hiding terrorist finance have to gain notorious popularity among financiers because it is the most convenience and criminally attractive method with a high level of anonymity and rapidity. Again, it is the most reliable means of transferring funds in the countries with poor and corrupt banking/financial institution. These informal means is prevalent in Africa because most African countries are still struggling with the menace of corruption and mismanagement of public funds with impunity.

b.) *Physical movement of funds:* Physical movement of cash by terrorist can be in the form of the conventional method of cash smuggling by means of

money laundering. Generally, cash smuggling is attractive; because smuggled money is completely fungible, anonymous and very easy to convert into any other financial resources and needs (Kiser, 2005). In most cases and for the purpose of avoiding the danger in moving raw cash (such as risk stole, defection, etc) some terrorist groups often convert the cash into diamond, gold and any other antiques and metals in which this cash can be stored and easily converted without any loss in value. Al-Qaeda is cited as the terrorist groups that use this method to move funds to any part of the world in support of their allies (Koh, 2006).

c.) *International trade system*: It is argued that international trade system gives wide chances for terrorist financiers to transfer value and goods through legitimate means of trade flows. This is done across many borders without suspicion because the paperwork approach and the shipments style in Africa look completely legitimate to any inspector (Passas, 2007).

### **Conclusion and recommendations**

As the paper conclude it draws from the security council resolution after the 9/11 attacks in United States of America. “The 9/11 attacks brought an international sense of urgency to disrupting terrorists’ financial networks. Within a few weeks, the UN Security Council adopted a wide-ranging resolution demanding countries take action to suppress terrorist financing. The following month, the Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental body, issued a list of recommendations that became the basis for many governments’ efforts. These included passing legislation specifically criminalizing terrorist financing, requiring financial institutions to report suspicious transactions, creating a greater degree of international cooperation in tracking down terrorist financiers, and ratifying the UN convention on financing terrorism, a step that has been taken by 150 countries.”

Despite the above, it appears that Africa is always a victim of terrorism. During the writing of this paper, Kenya was attacked by terrorists. The demand is that The Al Shabaab leaders have in multiple times demanded the

withdrawal of KDF from Somalia in exchange of stopping terror attacks. This is a form of a truce in good faith without a face to face negotiation. The assumption from this demand can be linked to power. The Kenyan government which is doing so much to bring peace and stability in Somalia is blamed for that wonderful act of Ubuntu. This can be inferred to terrorist movement desires for war at all times. And the promotion of Ubuntu and oneness are not in the objectives of the terrorist movements.

Africa needs to speak in one voice and fights against terrorism which is ravaging Africa at an alarming rate. Leaders of Africa should use means that can force the sponsors of terrorism to stop it. Africa should be jealous of their continent and drive terrorism out of Africa. Africa should exclude those who support terrorism and shun them through an embargo.

If money is not given to the hands of the terrorists, peace and stability and development will reign in Africa. Africa will experience lasting peace which will assist in the promotion of development and institute oneness. This will help the African continent to develop like other continents in the world. This paper, therefore, concludes that the challenges of insecurity, terrorism financing threats and national development have become an unholy marriage of inconveniences. Thus, the paper strongly recommends stopping the money from entering into the cell of a terrorist as one of the best approaches in fighting terrorism in Africa. Again, the role of politically exposed persons and states that throw their financial weights on terrorism financing should be nipped on the board by strengthening financial intelligent unit states. Additionally, State borders that are apparently porous ought to be completely closed with adequate security surveillance.

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**EFFECT OF VARIATION BETWEEN NIGERIAN NAIRA AND CFA FRANC ON CROSS-BORDER TRADE IN NIGERIA**

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**Abstract**

*This paper analyses the effect of variation between Nigeria Naira and the CFA Franc on cross-border trade in Nigeria. The analysis becomes necessary because the value of the Nigeria Naira has been fluctuating continually while the official currency (CFA Franc) of the country's largest cross-border trading partner (Benin Republic) does not experience similar dynamics*

*Result from the Impulse Response Function (IRF) and Variance Decomposition (VD) based on Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model show that response of cross-border trade to exchange rate innovation exhibits negative trend in the short-run as well as long-run suggesting that frequent exchange rate movements would discourage cross-border trade. Results further suggest that whenever exchange rate witnesses a distortion, either by monetary authority or the invisible hand of market forces, factors within the exchange rate system are responsible for its long-run adjustment. This study, not minding the incessant Naira depreciation, recommends that cross-border trading exercise between Nigeria and Benin Republic follows a smooth transition and therefore should be encouraged and allowed to strive at its own pace.*

**Keywords:** *Cross-border Trade, Exchange Rate, Currency for Francophone Africa (CFA) Gravity Model, VAR, Bilateral Trade*

## **1. Introduction**

The daily behavior of exchange rate remains a puzzle for both the academic communities and policy makers (Bauer, De Grauwe and Reitz, 2009). Two of the most vital border regions in West Africa are the frontier between Nigeria-Benin and Nigeria-Niger. These economies depend to a large extent on their cross-border trade, illegal and legal (Yussuf, 2015). Nigeria's two major cross-border trading partners (Niger and Benin Republic) have similar official currency which does not experience similar dynamism as Nigeria Naira owing to the fact that they are francophone countries and most francophone countries' currency are pegged with currency of their colonial masters, hence there exists some level of co-ordination (Hashim and Meagher, 1999). The foreign exchange situation in Nigeria is associated with a lot of problems because numerous Nigerian firms partake in international trade. This not only results in an issue of artificial scarcity but of value, because Nigerian Naira has been going through a continual depreciation in value since the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986. Studies show that the implementation of SAP resulted in an unprecedented devaluation of Naira which ordinarily would have supported a favourable cross-border trade balance (Hashim and Meagher, 1999). The most widely spent indigenous currencies in the West African border markets are; the Naira and CFA franc. However, evidence shows that these currencies are not easily substitutable without difficulty and not readily available through official means, although it seems to be more flexible in the francophone West African nations since they enjoy free transfer of funds because they fall within the West African Monetary Union (WAEMU), connoting common currency (CFA franc).

On the empirical side, with a special reference to the trade situation between Nigeria and the Republic of Benin, studies show that exchange rate differences (i.e. stability of the CFA Franc and depreciation of the Naira) have generated significant gap between prices at both sides of the border. Shortly after the SAP implementation in Nigeria, cross-border trade balance

which favoured Nigeria throughout the colonial period began to shift in favour of Niger, Benin Republic and other CFA Franc zones (Hashim and Meagher, 1999). Whereas the implementation of SAP which resulted in an unprecedented devaluation of Naira should support a favourable cross-border trade balance (Hashim and Meager, 1999) but it has been the other way round till date. This unfavourable shift in the balance of cross-border trade might be supplemented by a setback of the relationship between the values of Nigerian currency and the CFA Franc. The continuous fall of the Naira/CFA Franc exchange rate should make Nigeria exports of all categories to her immediate neighbouring countries attractive. Therefore, variation between the Naira and CFA Franc (either appreciation or depreciation against the Naira) is expected to have a strong link with the CBT volume. If stabilization of the Naira is sustained, what will be the resulting effect on CBT?

It is on this platform that this paper attempts to investigate the effect of variation between Nigeria Naira and CFA Franc on cross-border trade in Nigeria for the period 1999-2016

## **2. A Review of Related Theoretical and Empirical Literature**

Cross-border trade is an offshoot of bilateral trade. The link between the real exchange rate component and bilateral trade is often analyzed using gravity model of international trade. A simple form of gravity model was presented by Tinbergen (1962) into the field of international trade. Originating from Newton's gravity law, the theory states that trade between two countries is directly proportional to the economic masses of the two trading partner countries and indirectly proportional to the distance between them (Boke and Doganay, 2014)

The gravity model has become the regular methodology usually employed to study the bilateral trade relationship empirically, owing to its strong theoretical basis. Theoretical underpinnings of gravity models were first

presented by Anderson (1979) while Anderson (2011) and Head and Mayer (2013) present a comprehensive survey of the theoretical of its theoretical foundation. The literatures that make use of gravity models in empirical studying are found in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004), Tenreyro (2006) Bergstrand and Egger (2011), Oloba (2014), Oloba and Akinbobola (2017). While some of these studies dwell on the simple gravity framework, a handful share of them further extend the models to incorporate factors such as per capita income, adjacency, population, border effects, common language and colonial links, remoteness etc. in the regression (Boke and Doganay, 2014). Interestingly, a number of recent studies on cross-border trade have specified the gravity model to include border effects, proximity and other cross-border dummies that can influence cross-border trade (see Rafiq, 2013; Aker, 2014; Bahmani-Oskooee and Halicioglu, 2016; Arize, Malindretos and Igwe, 2017, Hayakawa, 2017).

Tenreyro (2006) used data on a broad sample of countries from 1970 to 1997 to investigate whether nominal exchange rate variability has any significant effect on trade flows. He argued that the conventional methods used to answer the perennial question of the impact exchange rate variability on trade flows are plagued by a variety of sources of systematic bias. In a bid to solving these biases, he developed the instrumental version of the pseudo – maximum likelihood estimate (IV – PML) and used it to estimate the gravity equation model for trade with cross sectional OLS estimating technique that predominates the conduct of previous studies. He eventually arrived at the conclusion that nominal exchange rate variability has no significant effect on trade flows. In a notable study by OECD (2011), the OECD simulated hypothetical appreciations or depreciations of 10 per cent of Chile and New Zealand’s exchange rates to see their impacts on their bilateral trade with the United States, the eurozone and China. It found that smaller, open economies such as New Zealand and Chile have to tolerate the full adjustment of exchange rate changes, relative to less trade-dependent, large economies.

Arinze, Malindretos & Igwe (2017) examines the impact of real effective exchange rate on trade balance of eight countries using the non-linear autoregressive distributed lag (NARDL) model. From their results, long-run cointegration analysis provides evidence indicating that when depreciation is separated from appreciation, depreciation is shown to have significant effects on the trade balance but in an asymmetric model. In a similar fashion, Bahamani-Oskoe and Halicioglu (2016) examined the asymmetric effects of exchange rate changes on the Turkish bilateral trade balances using the asymmetric cointegration approach. Result from the long-run asymmetric autoregressive distributed lag (AARDL) show that once appreciation is separated from depreciation using the partial sum processes, exchange rate changes of equal magnitude does not have similar effects on cross-border trade balances. Results show that the effects of exchange rate changes are asymmetric. More precisely, while Lira appreciation does not have any significant effect on Turkish bilateral trade balances, Lira depreciation has significantly favourable effects on Turkish trade balance with her European partners individually (France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Great Britain).

Further, Ahmed (2000) investigated the response of Bangladesh's aggregate merchandise exports to a real exchange rate-based trade liberalization programme during the period 1974-1996. Empirical results suggest that there exists a unique long-run or equilibrium relationship among real quantities of export, relative export price and export-weighted real effective exchange rate, relative export price (lagged two quarters), real effective exchange rate, predicted values of real GDP (lagged one quarter) and a dummy variable capturing the effects of trade liberalization programme have all emerged as important determinants of an aggregate export supply function for Bangladesh. In a related study by Kodongo and Ojah (2013) titled real exchange rates, trade balance and cross-border flows in Africa, the analysis of the intertemporal causal relationship between real exchange rate, capital flows and cross-border trade balance was done using annual data of nine major African countries for the period 1993-2009 with Panel VAR

technique. Their findings lend support to the classical balance of trade theoretical issues in which the net effect of depreciation of the domestic currency is an improvement in the domestic country's cross-border trade position in the short-run

Antweiler (2016) emphasized that a 2-way cross-border trade in homogenous goods existing between United State and Canada has strong link with the marginal costs. His results show that observed trade between Canadian provinces and United States strongly supports the theory. Also, the role of both permanent and temporary factors affecting the Indonesian current account and real exchange rate dynamics has been established by Affandi & Mochtar (2013) in a study titled current account and real exchange rate dynamics in Indonesia, result shows that shift of the real exchange rate behavior after year 2000 does not necessarily affect the current account dynamics.

### **3. Model Specification and Results**

#### **3.1 Model Specification**

As emphasized earlier, the Gravity Model represents the bilateral trade model pioneered by Tinbergen (1962), Pöyhönen (1963) and Linneman (1966). Bergstrand (1985, 1989) demonstrated its empirical robustness. The bilateral trade model adopted in this study follows Kodongo and Ojah (2013), Boke and Doganay (2014), Bahmani-Oskooee and Fariditavana (2015) and Arize, Malindretos and Igwe (2017)

$$NCBT_{ij} = \beta_0 Y_i^{\beta_1} Y_j^{\beta_2} REX_i^{\beta_3} U_{ij} \quad (3.1)$$

Where;

$NCBT_{ij}$  is the net cross-border trade between country  $i$  and  $j$ .  $i$  is the country under investigation (Nigeria) while  $j$  is the cross-border trading partner country (i.e. Benin Republic). In this paper, our definition of cross-border trade includes the trading activities that take place between two different nationals at the various markets close to the border. Also, any recorded

merchandise goods that crosses the border from country  $i$  to country  $j$  and vice-versa is taken into consideration. For the purpose of this study, CBT is measured as the value of export of country  $i$  to country  $j$  divided by the value if import from country  $j$  to country  $i$ . This is similar to the measure adopted in Hop *et al* (2013), Antweiler (2016), Bahmani-Oskooee and Halicioğlu (2016) and Arinze *et al* (2017).  $RER_i$  represents the real exchange rate in country  $i$ , proxied by real effective exchange rate (reer). The choice of using real effective exchange rate in place of real exchange rate in this study is justified in the literature as being appropriate for a bilateral trade analysis (see Arize, *et al.*, 2017). Real effective exchange rate is a measure of average of exchange rates between two countries and shows the fluctuation in the general value of the currency. Taking natural log of both sides we have;

$$\ln NCBT_{ij} = \ln \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln Y_i + \beta_2 \ln Y_j + \beta_3 \ln REER_i + U_{ij} \quad (3.2)$$

We further specify the above gravity equation framework to incorporate other important variables that determine bilateral trade as well as regional integration as observed in Rose (2000), Ajayi (2005), Babatunde (2006), Bishop (2011), Assane (2012), Kodongo and Ojah (2013), Boke and Doganay (2014), Aker *et al.*, (2014), Hayakawa (2017).

$$\ln NCBT_{ij} = \ln \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln Y_i + \beta_2 \ln Y_j + \beta_3 \ln REER_i + \beta_4 \ln D_{ij} + \beta_5 \ln DUT + \beta_6 \ln POP + \beta_7 \ln OP + \beta_8 e^{ECOWAS} + \beta_9 e^{BORDER} + U_{ij} \quad (3.3)$$

$REER$  is the real effective exchange rate (proxy for real exchange rate),  $POP$  represents population size; the sign could be positive or negative;  $D_{ij}$  is the distance between  $i$  and  $j$ , it is expected to have a negative sign because distance is negatively related to trade flows; it is proxied as transport cost.  $OP$  is the trade openness measured as the ratio of trade to GDP.  $DUT$  is used to represent duties. Duties are charges levied on tradable goods and services imported in and exported out of a country. The sign of the co-efficient is expected to be negative.  $ECOWAS$  is a dummy variable which is 1 if the

countries involved in cross-border trade are members of the same regional block and 0 if otherwise. *BORDER* is also a dummy variable which represents border effect. It is 1 for absence of geographical features such as rivers, mountains or any form of terrorism and militant activities that could impede trade at the border and 0 if otherwise.  $\beta_k$  ( $k=1, 2, \dots, 9$ ) are the coefficients estimated. In achieving the effect of variation between Naira and CFA Franc on CBT in Nigeria, we re-specify the benchmark model in equation (3.3) to incorporate two new variables that capture exchange rate between Naira and CFA Franc and its volatility. We then estimate (3.4) using the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model

$$\ln NCBT_{ij} = \ln \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln Y_i + \beta_2 \ln Y_j + \beta_3 \ln REER_i + \beta_4 \ln D_{ij} + \beta_5 \ln DUT + \beta_6 \ln POP + \beta_7 \ln OP + \beta_8 e^{ECOWAS} + \beta_9 e^{BORDER} + \beta_{10} exr_{NC} + \beta_{11} exvol_{NC} + U_{ij}$$

(3.4)

Where  $exr_{NC}$  represents exchange rate between Naira and CFA Franc.  $exvol_{NC}$  is exchange rate volatility between Naira and CFA Franc. For the purpose of this study, we measured the exchange rate volatility using the exponential generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (E-GARCH) model. The choice of the decision to make use of E-GARCH as a measure of volatility is not only because it is a parametric measure but also addresses the defects identified with both the pure GARCH model and the simple standard deviation measure. Equation (3.9) was then estimated to capture the effect of exchange rate variation between Naira and CFA Franc on CBT in Nigeria.

## 3.2 Results

### 3.2.1 Rationale for Variable Ordering

The variables considered in the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model are cross-border trade and exchange rate while all other variables are treated as exogenous and cross-border dummies. In line with the Nigeria's context, the

variables can be arranged or ordered in two ways; one, if exchange rate is the target variable, cross-border trade becomes the policy variable and thus, cross-border trade is ordered before the exchange rate. Two, if cross-border trade is the target variable, exchange rate becomes policy variable and in a case like this, exchange rate is ordered first. The purpose of the ordering is to reveal the transmission channels between the target and policy variables.

In Nigeria, exchange rate and cross-border trade have both been manipulated by government in recent times with a view to preventing the shocks from the two variables to degenerate into other sectors of the economy as the consequences could be disastrous. Two scenarios from the recent developments can be captured. One, the banning of the forty-one (41) items from our international trade list in 2015 was aimed at reducing the pressure on the Naira. In this case, exchange rate represents the target variable while cross-border trade or other forms of international trade is the policy variable. Two, the present dispensation devalued the currency from N197 to N305 in 2016 resulting in an intended exchange rate depreciation. The aim was to make export more attractive and make import dearer but particularly to reduce the magnitude of cross-border inflows into the economy and encourage competition among the local firms.

### **3.2.2 Impulse Response and Variance Decomposition**

The dynamics innovations to exchange rate (LOGEXRNC) and cross-border trade (LOGCBT) from period one (1) to period ten (10) are presented in fig. 5.3. The response of exchange rate to own innovation displays a positive trend from period 1 to 4 and drifts negatively between period 4 and 7 but in the long-run, it returns to positive trend. This shows that a shock to exchange rate increases exchange rate in the both short and long run but reduces the rate in the medium term. The response of exchange rate to own shock is in line with findings of Hegwood and Nath (2009). Response of cross-border trade to exchange rate exhibits a negative trend in the short-run as well as long-run. Precisely, a unit increase in the exchange rate between naira and CFA Franc will reduce cross border trade by 9% in the short-run (period 3)

and 5% in the long run (period 9). This finding is in line with the traditional theory of international trade which states that exchange rate depreciation would make export attractive and make import dearer.

The response of cross-border trade to own shock displays a positive trend from period 1 to period 2, a negative trend from period 2 to 5 but a positive trend in the long run. Response of cross-border trade to an innovation in the exchange rate on the other hand initially exhibits a negative trend before exhibiting a positive trend in the short-run, a negative trend in the medium-term and a positive trend in the long-run. This kind of relationship satisfies the J-Curve theory where it is assumed that exchange rate depreciation will initially depress trade balance but will later improve it.

The variance decomposition (VD) result presented in table 5.3.7 (see appendix) is used to examine the dynamic relationship between exchange rate (Naira and CFA Franc) and cross-border trade in Nigeria. Based on the first ordering, the first variable of analysis is the exchange rate. Exchange rate's response to own shock reflects strong (100%) effect in the short-run (first period) and it is observed to reduce slightly through the medium to long-run (85%). This means that whenever the exchange rate witnesses a distortion, either by the monetary authority or an invisible hand of market forces, factors within the exchange rate system itself are majorly responsible for its long-run adjustment. The magnitude influence of cross-border trade remains a shrinking percentage throughout the periods. It ranges from 0.00% in the first period to a minute peak of 15.87% in the long-run (eighth period). This shows that whenever the exchange rate is taken as the target variable, the policy variable such as cross-border trade will contribute 0% to variation in exchange rate in the first period but would contribute a significant share ranging from 13-16% from medium to long run.

### **3.3 Data Sources**

Secondary data was used in this study. Given the fact that procedures for the collection of data on cross-border trade are marred with gross biasness and

inconsistency due to numerous unrecorded or informal activities at the border, this study relied on a number of secondary sources to obtain data on cross-border trade. The sources include; National Institute of Statistics (NIS), Benin Republic, Nigeria Custom Service (NCS), COMTRADE UN Data (CD-ROM 2015) All other data were sourced from World Development Indicators (WDI), 2013 and various years.

#### **4. Conclusion and Policy Recommendation**

The day-to-day behavior of exchange rate in Nigeria remains a puzzle for both the academic community and policy makers, whereas, exchange rate plays a major role in determining the cross-border trade between Nigeria and her immediate regional neighbouring countries. The main motivation of this paper is that the country's official currency has been going through an incessant loss of value from the period of Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in 1986 while the official currency (CFA Franc) of the Nigeria's two major cross-border trading partners (Niger and Benin Republic) does not experience similar dynamics according to some studies (Hashim and Meagher, 1999; Constanze, 2014). Thus, an examination of the relationship between exchange rate variation and cross-border trade between Nigeria and her regional neighbours with less volatile currency rate should yield some interesting results.

However, in this study, the empirical results from the Impulse Response Function (IRF) show that a shock to exchange rate increases exchange rate in the both short and long run but reduces the rate in the medium term. The response of exchange rate to own shock is in line with findings of Hedgewood & Nath (2014). Response of cross-border trade to exchange rate exhibits a negative trend in the short-run as well as long-run. From Variance Decomposition based on Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model, we conclude that whenever the exchange rate witnesses a distortion, either by the monetary authority or an invisible hand of market forces, factors within the exchange rate system itself are majorly responsible for its long-run

adjustment. This paper also confirms the validity of the J-Curve theory of international trade with reference to the bilateral trade relationship between Nigeria and Benin Republic. The implication of the validity of the J-Curve theory is that bilateral trade relation between the two countries follows a smooth transition and would bring about an overall improvement in the future and thus should be encouraged. Also, with the climate of border dispute as being witnessed mostly in the Middle East and some part of Central America, peaceful cross-border trading exercise between Nigeria and Benin Republic could prevent any form of border dispute and foster a good peaceful co-existence between the two countries both economically and politically.

There has been a wide range of recommendation to Nigeria's government from researchers recently that attention should be shifted from the oil to the non-oil sector and allow it to ultimately drive the economy due to the instability of the oil revenue. This paper therefore recommends that attention should be shifted to cross-border trade sector of the economy now for the sake of diversification coupled with the fact that trading activities at the various Nigeria's borders are evolving. In the last few decades, government often ignored these activities with a wrong notion that capital base from such activities are insignificant for national growth. However, monitoring these trading activities and ultimately supervising them will not only help reduce smuggling but increase government revenue base. This can serve as one of the focal points for government to achieve its current aim of diversifying the economy.

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**Appendix**

VAR

Vector Autoregression Estimates

Date: 01/21/18 Time: 21:24

Sample (adjusted): 2001 2016

Included observations: 16 after adjustments

Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]

	LOGCBT	LOGEXRNC
LOGCBT(-1)	0.281893 (0.42011) [ 0.67100]	0.006863 (0.04542) [ 0.15110]
LOGCBT(-2)	-0.488323 (1.33686) [-0.36528]	-0.155638 (0.14455) [-1.07674]
LOGEXRNC(-1)	1.869195 (3.72246) [ 0.50214]	0.264995 (0.40248) [ 0.65840]
LOGEXRNC(-2)	3.497336 (4.13310) [ 0.84618]	0.264826 (0.44688) [ 0.59261]
C	-217.4942 (249.735) [-0.87090]	-18.61237 (27.0020) [-0.68930]

LOGTRFF	1.465938 (1.90900) [ 0.76791]	-0.077946 (0.20641) [-0.37763]
LOGTDOP	-1.367540 (3.11991) [-0.43833]	-0.302626 (0.33733) [-0.89711]
LOGPOP	18.51808 (14.9511) [ 1.23858]	0.933437 (1.61655) [ 0.57742]
LOGYNG	-0.986279 (3.04055) [-0.32438]	0.205548 (0.32875) [ 0.62524]
LOGYBN	-4.448380 (3.04509) [-1.46084]	-0.169210 (0.32924) [-0.51394]
BORDER	0.314810 (0.60315) [ 0.52194]	0.073742 (0.06521) [ 1.13077]
<hr/>		
R-squared	0.892812	0.970539
Adj. R-squared	0.678435	0.911616
Sum sq. resids	2.487770	0.029083
S.E. equation	0.705375	0.076267
F-statistic	4.164688	16.47143
Log likelihood	-7.813400	27.77841

Akaike AIC	2.351675	-2.097302
Schwarz SC	2.882830	-1.566147
Mean dependent	-1.998329	-1.336477
S.D. dependent	1.243901	0.256537

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Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)	0.000778
Determinant resid covariance	7.60E-05
Log likelihood	30.47111
Akaike information criterion	-1.058889
Schwarz criterion	0.003420

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VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM Test

Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h

Date: 01/21/18 Time: 19:28

Sample: 1999 2016

Included observations: 16

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Lags	LM-Stat	Prob
1	2.486421	0.6471
2	2.291382	0.6823

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Probs from chi-square with 4 df.

VAR Residual Normality Tests

Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)

Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal

Date: 01/21/18 Time: 19:31

Sample: 1999 2016

Included observations: 16

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Component	Skewness	Chi-sq	Df	Prob.
1	-0.309036	0.254676	1	0.6138
2	0.539944	0.777438	1	0.3779
Joint		1.032114	2	0.5969

---



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Component	Kurtosis	Chi-sq	Df	Prob.
1	2.705373	0.057870	1	0.8099
2	2.914815	0.004838	1	0.9445
Joint		0.062708	2	0.9691

---



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Component	Jarque-Bera	Df	Prob.
1	0.312546	2	0.8553
2	0.782276	2	0.6763
Joint	1.094822	4	0.8951

---



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Roots of Characteristic Polynomial

Endogenous variables: LOGCBT LOGEXRNC

Exogenous variables: C LOGTRFF LOGTDOP LOGPOP

LOGYNG LOGYBN BORDER

Lag specification: 1 2


Date: 01/04/80 Time: 02:14

Root	Modulus
$0.681825 - 0.712361i$	0.986075
$0.681825 + 0.712361i$	0.986075
$-0.408381 - 0.509929i$	0.653301
$-0.408381 + 0.509929i$	0.653301

No root lies outside the unit circle.

VAR satisfies the stability condition.

### Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial



VAR Residual Serial Correlation LM  
Tests

Null Hypothesis: no serial correlation at lag order h

Date: 01/04/80 Time: 02:17

Sample: 1999 2016

Included observations: 16

Lags	LM-Stat	Prob
1	2.486421	0.6471
2	2.291382	0.6823

Probs from chi-square with 4 df.

VAR Residual Normality Tests

Orthogonalization: Cholesky (Lutkepohl)

Null Hypothesis: residuals are multivariate normal

Date: 01/04/80 Time: 02:18

Sample: 1999 2016

Included observations: 16


Component	Skewness	Chi-sq	Df	Prob.
1	-0.309036	0.254676	1	0.6138
2	0.539944	0.777438	1	0.3779
Joint		1.032114	2	0.5969

Component	Kurtosis	Chi-sq	Df	Prob.
1	2.705373	0.057870	1	0.8099

2	2.914815	0.004838	1	0.9445
<hr/> <hr/>				
Joint		0.062708	2	0.9691
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
Component	Jarque-Bera	df	Prob.
1	0.312546	2	0.8553
2	0.782276	2	0.6763
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Joint	1.094822	4	0.8951
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Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations  $\pm 2$  S.E.




Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations  $\pm$  2 S.E.


Response of LOGCBT to LOGCBT




Response of LOGCBT to LOGEXRNC



Response of LOGEXRNC to LOGCBT




Response of LOGEXRNC to LOGEXRNC




Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations  $\pm$  2 S.E.


Response of LOGEXRNC to LOGCBT




Response of LOGEXRNC to LOGEXRNC



Response of LOGCBT to LOGCBT



Response of LOGCBT to LOGEXRNC



**Figure 5.4: Response of LOGCBT to LOGEXRNC**

**Table 5.3.7: Variance Decomposition Analysis**

**Table 5.3.7a: Variance Decomposition of LOGEXRNC:**

Period	S.E.	LOGCBT	LOGEXRNC
1	0.705375	0.000000	100.0000
2	0.713401	0.103651	99.89635
3	0.932980	13.37671	86.62329
4	1.054564	15.60955	84.39045
5	1.132018	14.50028	85.49972
6	1.136794	13.33322	86.66678
7	1.234537	14.51099	85.48901
8	1.349263	15.87489	84.12511
9	1.390184	15.37210	84.62790
10	1.396453	14.55987	85.44013

**Table 5.3.7b: Variance Decomposition of LOGCBT:**

Period	S.E.	LOGCBT	LOGEXRNC
1	0.076267	26.89412	73.10588
2	0.077982	28.38169	71.61831
3	0.152066	19.00543	80.99457
4	0.161286	17.99540	82.00460
5	0.167400	19.89776	80.10224
6	0.181929	20.31648	79.68352
7	0.204057	18.15438	81.84562
8	0.209123	17.78116	82.21884
9	0.212556	18.82594	81.17406
10	0.227279	18.83303	81.16697

Cholesky Ordering: LOGEXRNC LOGCBT

**Table 5.37c: Variance Decomposition of LOGEXRNC:**

Period	S.E.	LOGCBT	LOGEXRNC
1	0.705375	73.10588	26.89412
2	0.713401	72.46958	27.53042
3	0.932980	91.94125	8.058753
4	1.054564	92.77909	7.220906
5	1.132018	91.12444	8.875564
6	1.136794	91.31741	8.682589
7	1.234537	92.92065	7.079350
8	1.349263	93.12244	6.877561
9	1.390184	92.35737	7.642633
10	1.396453	92.59328	7.406724

**Table 5.3.7d: Variance Decomposition of LOGCBT:**

Period	S.E.	LOGCBT	LOGEXRNC
1	0.076267	100.0000	0.000000
2	0.077982	98.92608	1.073924
3	0.152066	95.70111	4.298887
4	0.161286	96.10676	3.893244
5	0.167400	96.57341	3.426594
6	0.181929	95.76469	4.235314
7	0.204057	95.11774	4.882261
8	0.209123	95.61526	4.384742
9	0.212556	95.81616	4.183845
10	0.227279	95.21601	4.783988

Cholesky Ordering: LOGCBT LOGEXRNC

**Inter-State Environmental Crisis In Nigeria: Focus On Amegu-Ikwo  
Ebonyi And Adadama Cross River Conflict**

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**Abstract**

*Africa as a continent is consistently suffering under the burden of multidimensional conflicts. These conflicts range from terrorism to resource wars, ethnic violence etc. Inter-communal conflict is one of the forms in which conflict has manifested in different parts of Africa. This study, which was developed using qualitative method focused on the Amegu-Ikwo and Adadama land conflict in Nigeria. Amegu-Ikwo and Adadama are border communities within Ebonyi State and Cross River State respectively. The researcher used Homer Dixon's theory of environmental conflict to trace the origin of the conflict to 1927 and its development. The study revealed how the conflict has become a recurrent crisis since 2011 to present. The multi-dimensional negative impact of the conflict and the roadmap to peace were also documented. Finally, the work called for a strong peace building alliance between the power elite, government and the masses in the conflict-ridden communities to ensure sustainable peace.*

**Keywords:** *Conflict, Land, Peace, Ikwo & Adadama*

**Introduction**

The Amegu-Ikwo and Adadama peoples are hitherto historic brothers who lived peacefully with one another for ages. They engaged in pre-colonial diplomacy and exchanged material and non-material culture till the rise of colonialism. The era of colonialism led to the rise of state formation as well as different forms of administration, which directly began to sow the seed of negative group identity amongst the different peoples of Africa. Within that colonial period, Ikwo and Adadama were administered within different colonial administrative sphere. The location of both communities within the

banks of the popular Oferekpe or Ebonyi River made their geo-political importance as a trading port fundamental. Soon, the negative re-enforcement of their competition over the traditional port area immediately threw them into the path of conflict over the rightful owner of a piece of land lying in the border of the two communities.

The origin of the conflict has been traced to the colonial era of Nigerian history. The Ikwo people have had several conflicts with their neighbours, of which many has resulted to full blown pre-colonial war. Ikwo have fought with their brother neighbours (Izzi and Ezza), however, a higher percentage of their pre-colonial wars with their neighbours have been with various nations from the Cross Rivers region. These nations include the Awkwu, Ntsobo, Adadama, Isobobikobiko/Isobo, Otaka, Ofomana, Okpeji, among others. These conflicts and wars arose mainly from disputes over land, or misunderstanding over environmental resource control. These misunderstanding over environmental resource quickly leads to the killing of a native of one group by another, and the further retaliation of the aggrieved group. Most of these groups of Cross River people are said to have migrated to some part of Ikwo, across the river, to settle and dwell with the message of peace. According to Jonah Nkpuruka in an oral interview, some of these people came in small groups, requesting for temporal settlements. These small groups however spread and grew in number due to population explosion, taking over and usurping more lands at the detriment of the Ikwo people. The encroachment into more land, led the Ikwo to fall out with these foreign tribes, leading to incessant conflicts of which some evolved into full scale pre-colonial war. Ironically, the Ikwo and Adadama have been caught up in the inferno of conflict since colonial era till 2019. Unfortunately, the reactive conflict management strategies used to curtail the crisis does not in any way reveal that the conflict will end in the years to come.

“The Adadama-Ikwo war dates back to the colonial days after the colonial masters had demarcated the boundary between Cross River and the people of Eastern Region with some residents breaching the border demarcation by

farming in their neighbouring villages without respect to the border demarcation” (*The Voice*, 2015:12). The oral tradition of the people maintains that the community leaders were not consulted by the colonial imperialists when they wilfully shared out the people’s land leading to claims and counter-claims by both the Ikwo and Adadama that their land were forcefully handed over to the other community, which they completely rejected. Thus, there has been a long-standing land dispute between Amegu-Ikwo in Ebonyi State and Adadama in Cross River, which dates back to 1927. The Government of Ebonyi State revealed that earlier in 1912, the two communities mutually fixed the *Ugoli* as their boundary but over the years, the people of Adadama began to claim a new location as their boundary (Government of Ebonyi State of Nigeria, 2013:9). The situation was worsened by the forceful colonial border demarcation as well as the contemporary force of acceptance of those border areas as the determinant of geo-political areas within the sovereign borders of the post-independent African States, irrespective of the undeniable reality that the colonial borders separated hitherto brotherly kiths and kilns into different communities, states, protectorates and countries.

Briefing newsmen on the escalation of the Ikwo-Adadama crisis recently, the former Deputy Governor of Ebonyi and current Governor of the state, Dave Umahi stated then that on Saturday 14<sup>th</sup> January, 2013, the Ebonyi State Government got another report that the crisis had escalated following the renewed attacks on Amegu people who went to their farm. Since then, in spite of government efforts to contain the situation, the area remained tense and conflict ridden. Government of Ebonyi State of Nigeria revealed that on that day, 14<sup>th</sup> January, 2013; “gunmen from Adadama invaded Ochuenyim village in Ndiagu Amegu Ikwo, abducted 2 persons (a man and a woman) and wounded several others. As soon as such information reached us, all the security agencies were alerted and the Commissioner of Police ordered the deployment of Mobile Policemen to the area to forestall possible reprisals” (Government of Ebonyi State of Nigeria, 2013:9). It was reported that on 19<sup>th</sup>

January, 2013, the area witnessed renewed attack on a number of Amegu Ikwo people who went to farm, leading to the escalation of the conflict. The Amagu Ikwo people quickly engaged in their popular guerrilla war strategy and retaliated on their Adadama neighbours. The years that followed witnessed the inability of the police and security agencies to check the attacks and counter-attacks from each of the conflict actors. The conflict raised its ugly head in 2014 and escalated in 2015. This study is a synoptic investigation into the dynamics of the conflict and the effort made so far to ensure lasting peace.

### **Methodology**

This section presents the techniques used in the development of the study or research design. The study is a qualitative research. This method was adopted as a way of accessing the existing data on Ikwo-Adadama conflicts in Nigeria. The researcher searched extensively into the scarce secondary sources on the conflict in order to eke-out the historical evidence as well as contemporary dynamics of land conflict in the area. The explorative research style was used to investigate into the current status of land resource as a major fillip to the rise of inter-state conflicts between Ebonyi State and Cross River State in Nigeria. The researcher also gathered primary interviews from eye-witness accounts as well as observers of the conflict dynamics for decades. Two focus group discussions of five to seven men were carried out in each of the two conflict environments of Amagu-Ikwo and Adadama. Data analysis of existing secondary materials that were used in the study were presented thematically to ensure coherence.

### **Theoretical Framework**

This study is centred on Homer-Dixon's theory of environmental conflicts. According to Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, population growth and resource depletion converge to produce conflicts in many parts of the developing world. He found that environmental scarcity leads to economic deprivation, and contributes to civil strife as well as the increases in economic and

political pressures on governments; possibly resulting in the weakening of state legitimacy. Increased gaps between population groups within a state due to the scarcity of resources produce grievances and rivalries, leading to conflict. Due to the scarcity of resources, groups may find it necessary to migrate in search of land and other resources. (Homer-Dixon, 1994:5-40; Homer-Dixon, 1993; Homer-Dixon, Boutwell & Rathjens, 1993).

However, some other groups like the Ikwo and Adadama will refuse to migrate but decides to remain in their historic settlement and fight till they are able to expel their enemies. The causes of environmental scarcity are said to lie in environmental changes such as drought or soil erosion, population growth, which place greater pressure on existing resources and the unequal distribution of resources, thus limiting its access (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraft, 1997:164). This theory of environmental conflicts maintains that reductions occurring in the amount or quality of resources reduce overall total environmental resources available, while an increase in population means a division of the remaining portions of land resources into smaller portions, thus creating scarcity, struggle for scarce environmental land resource and the conflict that follows. It was the scarcity of land and the increasing pressure of population explosion in Ikwo and Adadama that intensified the lad conflict since colonial era to present.

### **The Conflict Trends**

Zartman (1991:299) posits that conflict is an inevitable aspect of human interaction and the concomitant of choices and decisions. Conflict can be viewed as an incompatible interaction between at least two parties where one of the parties, experiences damage and the other party causes damage intentionally. Coser (1956: 121) argues that conflict occurs “when two or more people engage in a struggle over values and claims to status, power and resources in which the aims of opponents are to neutralise, injure or eliminate their rivals”. Thus, it could be stated that conflict is driven by irreconcilable competitions. Miller (2003) states that conflict is a situation of incompatibility where strong desire on the part of one party to carry out ‘the

means' or achieve 'the ends' are, or appears to be incompatible with the other. Thus, the incompatibility of aims, desires and goals remain a driver of conflict. Hocker and Wilmot (1985) present conflict as the interaction of interdependent people who clash because of perceived incompatible goals and interferences from each other in achieving their goals. Folger, Poole and Stutman (1997) explained it better when they argued that conflict is driven by perceived incompatible goals and interference from each other in achieving these goals. It should be noted that the level of reaction or conflict that arises when there are cases of incompatibility, differs from actors to environment, situation and time when such cases arose. But for Stagner (1995), conflict is simply the violent expression of this incompatibility. In Ikwo and Adadama conflict setting, the incompatible factor here remains the acceptance that a given portion of land within their borders is the natural heritage of any of the conflict parties.

One of the immediate causes of the conflict between the two communities has been traced by Governor Dave Umahi to "November 23, 2011 when some irate youths from Adadama attacked a team of consultants working on a World Bank Assisted Erosion Management Project at Ndiagu Amegu Ikwo. The Adadama youths arrested the workers and seized their equipments. When I got the information; I promptly alerted the Deputy Governor of Cross River State via a letter dated 23<sup>rd</sup> November, 2011, while the workers and their equipments were later released" (Amadi, 2013:18)

Consequently, it was reported that on 7<sup>th</sup> January, 2012, Oke Alo, a native of Ochuenyim in Ndiagu Amegu Ikwo went to harvest fish from a pond belonging to Bomboy Elechi Oguiyi, who hails from the Ochuenyim Ndiagu, Amegu Ikwo; suddenly, 21 youths from Adadama pounced on him, abducted him and disappeared with his water draining machine. The people of Amagu Ikwo also stated that Nwigboji Nwanchonu who disappeared on October 11, 2012 was also kidnapped by the Adadama people. The former Youth Leader of the People's Democratic Party, Chinedu Oga, who is from one of the communities stated that they attacked our community and abducted a woman

and a boy, inflicted gunshot wounds on our people and burnt several houses. He noted that the abduction of Amegu Ikwo people by the Adadama people became intensified in August, 2012.

The crisis between the people of Adadama in Abi local Government Area of Cross River State and the people of Ndiagu Amagu community in Ikwo Local Government Area of Ebonyi State re-escalated in 2013. Both communities accused each other of throwing the first stone that gave birth to the crisis. The central cause of the crisis in that year was the accusation and counter-accusation that warlords from one community entered the other community and abducted their sons and daughters, while burning and looting the properties of members of the different communities. “In 2014 , the crisis degenerated and led to loss of lives and properties from both sides which made the governments of Cross River and Ebonyi states to declare the area in dispute a buffer zone, while efforts to get the National Boundary Commission to demarcate the area was still in progress” (*The Voice*, 2015:12)

The 2015 conflict between the two communities was said to have started again when some farmers from Amagu Ikwo went to their farms located within the buffer zone without knowing that warlords from Adadama were laying ambush and opened fire on them killing 11 persons. It was reported that the timely intervention of security agencies stopped the Amagu Ikwo people from retaliating the massive loss of lives. The months of June and July, 2015 was thus characterized by sporadic shooting by men suspected to be warlords from both communities, which re-echoed and intensified the psychology of fear amongst the citizens of both communities. Since then till 2019, the conflict has remained re-current and every effort to get the National Boundary Commission to permanently demarcate the area have also been frustrated by the nature of petty politics, poor civil service culture as well as lack of diligence by workers in the Nigerian work environment.

**Impact of the Conflict**

The 2013 conflict led to the massive destruction of properties. Amadi (2013:1) reported that at least eight persons lost their lives from Amegu, Ikwo while not less than six people were sentenced to eternity from Adadama in the 2013 conflict. Dave Umahi revealed that eight persons from Ndiagu Amegu Ikwo were abducted from Ndiagu Amegu Ikwo between January-February, 2013. The corpse of one of them by name Omori Ogbonnaya was found in the midst of the 2013 conflict, while the body of the other seven were not traced. Not less than 11 people from Ikwo were feared to have been killed in a renewed hostility between the people of Adadama in Cross River State in June, 2015. Among the victims were two tobacco dealers, Jude Nwite Ayim and Linus Nwele. They were said to have made a farm trip to the contested buffer zone and disappeared into eternity since then.

The conflict also witnessed the displacement of a large number of people from both communities. A total of forty-five houses belonging to Amegu Ikwo people were raised down in the 2013 conflict. Thousands of families were consequently displaced. That made the State Emergency Management Agencies to source for relief materials, which were distributed to affected communities and individuals. It should be noted that the communal clash which ravaged both communities from June-July, 2015 made many residents of Ochi-Ayim Amegu and Item Amegu as well as Adadama people to flee from their homes and relocate to assumed safer parts of the communities as well as other peaceful cities within the Nigerian State. “The gravity of the communal war made it that a popular market known as Nwanga Ngbo market located between Okpuitumo people and Amegu community was closed down for security purposes” (Oginyi, 2015:24).

The economic implication of the conflict cannot be neglected. The people of the area, who are mainly farmers, have been complaining over the dangerous negative implications of the conflict to their carrier. Many of them were not able to plant rice, yam and cassava which they sale to eke-out a living. The implication is that the conflict circle is not only threatening the people’s

economic security but also their food security as there is little farming space as well as very poor social peace and security, which the people needed principally before going to farm.

### **Road to Peace**

It should be stated that both the Ebonyi and Cross River State governments have been making efforts to ensure the peaceful resolution of the land dispute in spite of the attacks, criticisms, abductions and killings that has been witnessed in the conflict-prone environment in recent times. On 6<sup>th</sup> October, 2011, there was a joint meeting of officials of the two states in Calabar, the Cross River State capital and it was agreed that an inter-state Peace Committee be established. They were to chart a road map for peace and the final demarcation of the boundary of both Ebonyi and Cross River States along the contested terrain. The members of the peace committees from both sides were meant to meet on a monthly basis. Unfortunately, while the Ebonyi people constituted their committee and sent to the Cross River State, they did not constitute their own peace committee members till 2013 when the conflict erupted again. It should be noted that the inability of the Cross River government to establish their own peace committee members frustrated the quest to dialogue and the charting of a new path to peace until the 2013 conflict. Ebonyi State Government of Nigeria stated that “to get Cross River State to attend the Peace Committee meetings is like making a camel to pass through the eye of the needle” (Government of Ebonyi State of Nigeria, 2013:9).

The immediate past governor of Ebonyi State, Chief Martin Nwancho Elechi visited the people of Amegu, Ikwo on 15<sup>th</sup> January, 2013 and pleaded with them to remain calm and embrace peace. The Ebonyi State Government promised not to abandon the Amegu people as long as they did not take laws into their hands. The then governor of the state had an on the spot assessment of the situation. He was accompanied by the Ebonyi State Commissioner of Police at that time, Mamman Sule. A detachment of mobile policemen were sent to the contested zone in 2013. They were ordered to maintain peace and

buster security of lives and properties without taking sides with any of the two communities claiming ownership of the land. The Deputy Governor of Ebonyi State contacted his counterparts in Cross River State, who at that time was acting for the governor. They agreed that there was need for the peace committees from both states to meet and find amicable solutions to the land dispute. The Ebonyi Deputy Governor and the then Ag. Governor of Cross River State were said to have met in Federal Capital Territory, Abuja on 18<sup>th</sup> January, 2013 to discuss more on the road to peace, while maintaining their position that the conflict-prone communities would be prevailed upon to prevent further escalation of the crisis situation. Also, the Chairmen of both Ikwo Local Government Area of Ebonyi State and his counterparts in Abi Local Government of Cross River State in 2013 placed machineries on ground to halt the activities of criminals and war-mongers who use speed boats to attack unsuspecting Nigerians living on both sides of the conflict divide.

There was also the call that the National Boundary Commission (NBC) should intervene in demarcating the land border between both communities/states. The immediate past Deputy Governors of Cross River and Ebonyi States after series of peace meeting on the road to peace in contested land wrote to the NBC. The Ebonyi State and Cross River States Governments have earlier established boundary committees to look into the dynamics of the boundary relations between them and their neighbouring states. The Ebonyi State Government wrote a letter to the NBC on 11<sup>th</sup> December, 2011 demanding that they should “constitute a joint team of officials of both states and demanded NBC to do ethnographic study of both states to avoid mistrust and hostilities. We have done several other reports on the problem without results. It would seem that the NBC has abandoned its earlier attempt to do ethnographic study of the area following threats from Cross River State indigenes to the Commission not to steep feet into the disputed area” (Government of Ebonyi State of Nigeria (2013:9). The multiple nature of the bottleneck that cripples government bureaucracy in Nigeria had never

allowed the commission to engage in a comprehensive ethnographic study of the area, let alone demarcating the border clearly.

Sequel to the June 2015 outbreak of crisis, the current Deputy Governor of Ebonyi State, Dr Kelechi Igwe made a trip to Calabar, Cross River State to meet the current Cross River State Deputy Governor, Prof. Ivara Ejemot-Esu. Ivara Ejemot Esu said the meeting was to get briefed by key players and major stakeholders in the management of the crisis since the two administrations are new. They agreed to constitute the inter-state peace committee. The members of the committee will determine the factors responsible for the failure of previous peace initiatives in Yaya/Izzi, Obubura/ Abakaliki, Obubura/ Ikwo and Abi/ Ikwo communities (other border communities between both states where intermittent conflicts are experienced). The committee members include “Deputy Governors, Commissioners of Justice, Commissioners of Local Government, Permanent Secretaries in the office of Deputy Governors, Special Advisers on Security Matters, Brigade Commanders, Commissioners of Police, Surveyor General and directors of state security services” (Oginyi,2015:24). They were also mandated to critically examine the boundary lines proposed by the National Boundary Commission as well as critically examine the existing boundary demarcation captured in various areas. It was also resolved that six-man sub-committees be constituted in each of the four sections in dispute to help speed up the job of the central committee and the affected local government chairman and secretary are to serve as chairman and secretary respectively.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

This paper is synoptic history of the inter-communal conflict between the people of Amegu Ikwo, Ebonyi State and the Adadama of Cross River State in Nigeria respectively. It traced the origin of the conflict to the colonial period. The work however revealed that since 2011, the conflict has re-echoed on a yearly basis. The multi-dimensional impact of the conflict was also documented before the efforts at peace building by the governments of the states involved in the conflict were presented. The conflict affected inter-

group relations on the Ikwo-Adadama border of Ebonyi and Cross River States.

Finally, there is the need for the speedy stimulation of the activities Inter-State Peace Committee. They need to consult the local communities extensively this time to ensure that the process does not break down because of the inability of the power elite to carry the community actors along in the peace process. Consequently, their findings should be submitted to NBC to enable it quickly demarcate the boundaries of the border communities amongst both states. The place of legal instrument in the peace process cannot be neglected. Transitional justice is needed to manage the psychology of revenge planted in the heart of those that have lost their loved ones in the course of the recurrent conflicts. Such transitional justice backed by informal peace education would help the masses to migrate from the sense of horror and move to a condition of peace consciousness driven by re-conditioning their mind for peace through its facilitation by messages of forgiveness and reconciliation. Again, the place of traditional peace building should not be neglected. It is a necessary instrument that should be driven by peace-loving members of the communities involved in the conflict in order to promote lasting peace.

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