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AYIKA

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**AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN
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EDITORIAL POLICY

AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA is a journal that provides an avenue to scholars, researchers, policy analysts, think tank groups, as well as the civil society community to ventilate the various ramifications of the relations between environment and politics and development in Africa. The causal relationship between the environment and politics and vice versa has grown such that the scientific and political communities have fundamentally and unprecedentedly come to agreement as to the cause(s) of environmental problems. Hence, there is a growing recognition of government as the consumer of scientific findings on the environment such as that this journal portends. This point, in many respect, led to the inauguration of this journal. It is as a consequence of addressing environmental governance issues from the global level right to the local and municipal levels across the world and with special interest on Africa's landscape that AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA was established.

Coupled with an ever-growing number of environmental movements and the broadening scope of environmental protection and environmental security advocacy and activism, the journal garners relevance. That is, a meaningful venture therefore to critically periscope the environment-politics nexus that this journal represents is because it appreciates the environment's complex realities in our modern world. The necessity of this journal too stems from many cases of resource-rich nations in Africa that have largely failed to translate their endowments into mass wealth and development, and thereby give rise to what scholars have tagged "resource curse" and/or affliction, to entrench sustainable environment in the continent.

Hitherto in the African continent, there has been recognised absence of much intellectual, academic and advocacy platforms upon which to discuss issues of environment-politics linkages in the continent in tandem with the rest of the world. While many existing academic mediums treat issues on the relationship between environment and politics as part of larger themes on

geography, agricultural science and the sciences generally, regrettably those in the humanities and social sciences have not fared better on this. It is for the reason of providing a platform for intellectuals in the humanities and social sciences alongside those in all other spheres of academic research that the Editorial Team purposefully pursued to ground **AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA**.

Vision/Mission Statement

The vision and mission statements of *AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA* revolves around “Ayika”- a Yoruba word that refers to the environment. The linkage that the environment has to Africa’s socio-political development is no more under contestation. In fact, such a linkage is now established such that every discourse – be it an academic discussion and every other form of dialogue – notes the relationship between the environment and development in general. Thus, existing and emerging environmental problems are ever more political and now require political solutions more than ever. Whereas, the nature of the African continent is such that environmental problems are increasing and rising steadily and by the day, and in many cases, the negations are as a result of existing poor public infrastructure, disjointed socio-structural arrangements, lack of good policies and abysmal governmental investments in the continent’s environment sector. Therefore, *AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA* sets ultimately as its vision/mission statement the pursuit to bridge the gap of Africa’s underdevelopment emanating from her “Ayika”. This is given that new environmental problems such as climate change continues to impact on the daily lives of the African man and woman, yet mitigation and adaptation policies and strategies are chiefly nascent, ineffectual and in most cases poor. This journal, therefore, will aid to illuminate the views of scholars that argue that new environmental realities deemed developmental problems - as is the actual case in Africa- flow from political culture and politics that places very

weak emphasis on thorough and concrete conceptualisation of the environment-politics nexus for the continent's development.

Scope of the Journal

“Ayika” means environment in Yoruba language of Nigeria. Hence, *AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA* is established to treat issues of environment in ways that will provide sound policy and socio-economic and political perspectives from scholars within and outside the African continent. Papers to feature in this journal may speak to the global dimension of environmental issues, but must have profound bearing on the African connection in terms of abating tremendously the environmental inducing underdevelopment variables in the continent. By implication, the journal will provide, and be, an avenue to proffer practical policy and political insights to Africa's most pressing and strategic environmental issues.

Aim of the Journal

AYIKA: JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT AND POLITICS IN AFRICA is an environment politics journal in Africa that so much focuses on the African continent. It covers theoretical, policy, programmatic and other overarching dimensions and dynamics of environmental politics, governance and diplomacy in Africa. As a result of this, original review articles and every other kind of intellectual manuscript from academic fields cum disciplines such as philosophy, geography, international relations, economics, political science, sociology, psychology and related scholarly areas will be published in the journal.

House Style

The journal is based on universal standards of presentation of papers for academic journal publication. That is, papers should be segmented and should begin with an Abstract. The Abstract should not exceed 300 words and should be in italics. The author(s) are at liberty to segment the body of their papers according to a preference. Paper length will differ with every other publication based on the Editorial Team's designation. The Harvard

and APA referencing styles are preferable amongst other referencing techniques. Author(s) will be provided with an email address where their paper(s) should be sent to every quarterly and the sending frame for papers should be in Word Format.

Issues

This journal is published two times annually. Meaning that, each issue will be published once within six months of the year. The journal will be committed to global best practices in academic journal publication. There will be double blind review for every article submitted to this journal.

EDITORIAL NOTE

Elections and its dynamics are critical to the institutionalization of the democratic process. This is more for the African continent given the chequered political history. Since the end of the Cold War that saw the appreciation of democracy as the most popular system of rule and one which African countries bought into following decades of varying forms of illiberal rule, elections on the continent have been a collector's item for research and policy governance. In the year 2019, various types of elections held across the continent. The common thread in most these elections was violence and other malaises that brought to the fore the need to re-examine elections and its dynamics on the continent. Can we say, elections are now the only accepted route to political power on the continent? This question resonates in the papers published in this issue of AYIKA: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa.

The journal is a platform for the discourse of African environmental and political dynamics. The papers featuring in this issue of the journal dwell on Elections and Electoral violence in Africa. Elections are a critical item on the development agenda of African countries. It is therefore pertinent to interrogate the many issues that are bedeviling the process. The papers are a product of the International Conference on Elections and Electoral Violence in Africa, held at the University of Lagos, Nigeria, from December 4-6, 2019. The agenda of the conference was to come up with practical and policy-relevant recommendations that can help proffer solutions to the many issues in the electoral processes of African countries. We, therefore, use this medium to appreciate all participants at the conference for the robust contributions to presentations at the various breakaway sessions of the gathering of elections enthusiasts.

This journal strives for professionalism in all the aspects of its publication. This we have ensured in the careful selection and processing of the articles featuring in this issue. The issue is also a product of the efforts of many of colleagues who have served as reviewers and others who contributed in one

or the other. Hence, we appreciate them immensely for this. This issue of AYIKA: Journal of Environment and Politics in Africa contribute to the discourse of African politics, elections, governance and development that can serves as focus for scholars, civil society activists, politicians and students of African politics and elections as we all grapple with the issues and challenges in elections on the continent.

Bamidele Olajide

Editor, Volume 2, Number 1

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**High Gains High Stakes, Make It or Break It: Theorizing the
Foundations of Electoral Violence in Africa**

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Abstract

Election is not an end in itself but a means to an end. Supposedly, such end would refer to resultant political goods, development, peace, and progress democratic societies are expected to enjoy. However, the observed spate of electoral fraud, violence, money bag politics, prebendalism, vote buying, among other factors continually undermine and sometimes overshadow the progress made in democratization efforts in Africa. While copious studies have highlighted the above factors as the bane of credible elections and threat to democratic consolidation in Africa, a deeper understanding of why these factors in the first place come into play in Africa's elections is further desired. This study, therefore asks the central question, "Why do African political actors invest enormous resources in elections and employ violence?" This article theoretically thus explains that the vast "access" political office holders have to state resources is the driving force behind the desperation to winning elections. Adopting Nigeria as the centrepiece of its argument, this work argues that achieving much gains on the front of Africa's democratic consolidation requires more than the strengthening of institutional frameworks for elections, as the ideology and perception of political actors towards the essence and acquisition of political power plays a very strong role in the overall engagement of these actors in electoral violence and other electoral vices. Consequently, it is suggested that political offices be made less attractive by ensuring that the gains of winning elections, and the disadvantages of losing them are reduced to avoid the violence that a winner-takes-all situation can trigger.

Keywords: *Democratization, Election in Africa, Theory of Access, Vote Buying, Electoral Violence, Political Corruption*

Introduction

Elections are the hallmark of representative democracy, allowing the people's regular input in choices about leaders and policy. Yet they are also competitive processes, which could unleash conflict and tensions that, if not constructively managed, could potentially destabilize the fabric of states and societies. Since the new wave of democratization in Africa in the early 1990s, elections have become a core ingredient of popular participation in the governance process. At the same time, elections have spawned conflicts and violence, and invariably scrambled ethnic and regional alliances that sometimes threaten the social order, economic development, and efforts to strengthen national integration.

Violence during elections has greatly undermined peaceful coexistence in many societies, as observed in the cases of Lesotho 1998 and 2007, Kenya 2007/2008, Zimbabwe 2008, Nigeria in 2011, and Ivory Coast 2010/2011. This could also culminate into revolutions leading to regime changes, as seen in Tunisia and Egypt from 2011–2012. Furthermore, countries like Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Guinea, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Uganda have also witnessed common scenario of low-intensity violence, widespread coercive intimidation of both candidates and voters including harassment, imprisonment and assassinations; violent riots and clashes between supporters or security elements of the competing political parties; and attacks on local party headquarters and party symbols (Adolfo et. al., 2012).

It is again observed that while so many African countries have so far made significant progress in the actualization of sustainable credible election and greatly consolidated on their democratization efforts, it is sad to note that many have significantly retrogressed lately. The resurfacing of violence, disruptions, diversion of voting materials, kidnapping of electoral officials, snatching and stuffing of ballot boxes, killings, and intimidation of voters

during the 2019 Kogi and Bayelsa States' gubernatorial elections in Nigeria again indicate a decline in the democratic consolidation efforts of such a country that has hitherto made notable progress. Among the dastardly acts recorded during the Kogi State election was the murder of the PDP women leader, who was burnt alive in her residence by political thugs.

While studies have been dedicated to the discourse of the causes of electoral violence in Africa, most studies largely focus on the institutional dimension of the topic with little consideration on the attitudinal perspective, which in itself is a product of the prevailing dynamics of the African socio-cultural, economic and political setup.

This study therefore presents further arguments to extend the viewpoints of existing literature concerning the influence of the gains of politics on exhibited desperation for power. This work formulates an explanation on the interrelatedness of the high gains that accompany political positions and how these gains attract high stakes (for the attainment of such positions), thus cumulating into fierce contests, especially in a winner-takes-all circumstance. By introducing a 'theory of access', the work extends the viewpoint of the 'gains of politics' by presenting arguments that transcend the official emoluments of political officeholders.

Theoretical Arguments

The discourse on the causes of electoral violence in Africa has attracted a series of explanations and perspectives. Scholars have identified several structural and institutional factors as the bane of peaceful and credible elections in Africa. In most of these studies, the role and activities of Election Management Bodies have been observed to be key variables in the occurrence of violence. It has also been argued that election fraud, high probability of regime change, low GDP per capita, illiberalism and

majoritarian electoral rules cause a higher risk of electoral violence (Forsberg, 2018).

For instance, Norris (1997), Birch (2007), Fjelde & Hoglund (2014) considered the consequences of “electoral engineering”, or how an electoral system can mitigate or encourage the use of violence based on how groups in society end up represented. Violence is not the only dimension affected by the choice of electoral system. Just as pointed out in Norris (1997) that “electoral rules are not neutral.” In her paper, she compared the advantages and disadvantages of different types of electoral systems. She highlights some now well-known facts that majoritarian systems can manufacture majorities in legislative bodies with only small swings in the percentage of the votes grabbed by parties.

Similarly, with cross-national data on electoral violence in Sub-Saharan African elections between 1990 and 2010, Fjelde and Hoglund (2014) develop and test a theory that links the use of violent electoral tactics to the high stakes put in place by majoritarian electoral institutions. In their work, they argue that electoral violence is more likely in countries that employ majoritarian voting rules and elect fewer legislators from each district. Majoritarian institutions are, as predicted by theory, particularly likely to provoke violence where large ethno-political groups are excluded from power and significant economic inequalities exist.

However, beyond the roles electoral systems could play in triggering electoral violence, this work tries to formulate explanations that further establish correlations among the (gains) benefits that accompany holding political positions, the stakes of attaining such positions and the resultant fierce contests.

As a guide, I hereby present the following assumptions

1. In countries where there is unbridled ‘access’ to state resources (exposed to political corruption), the ‘gains’ of winning elections are high.
2. When such gains are high, the stakes of winning such elections are consequently also high.
3. Where the stakes are high - especially in a winner takes all situation -, the process of emerging as winner thereby becomes fiercely contested.

Analysing the ‘Gains’ through a Theory of ‘Access’

When discussing the gains of winning elections and holding political offices in Africa, pundits and studies have commonly focused on the monetary value officially accruable to the officeholder. For example, Onuigbo et al. (2017) and Onyishi & Eme (2013) in their studies showed how the huge emolument payable to government officials have attracted unhealthy rivalry for political power. This is mostly the case because countries where over 70 percent of the population lives in extreme poverty, politics is seen as an escape route from poverty. Evidently, over the decades, African politicians and other public office holders have promoted ostentatious lifestyles not been mindful of the sufferings of the masses. In most cases, those who win state power can have all the wealth they want even without working, while those who lose the struggle for state power cannot have security in the wealth they have made even by hard work. The capture of state power inevitably becomes a matter of life and death. That is one reason why our politics is so intense, anarchic and violent”

Again, Onuigbo et al. (2017) argued that elected representatives of the people at the local, state and federal levels of government earn higher wages and allowances more than their counterparts in the developed countries. Hence, the struggle for political power through any means becomes inevitable in Nigeria’s political space.

However, the ‘gains’ I refer to in this work transcend the official emoluments accruable to political officeholders. This is largely because while there is empirical evidence to show that politicians in countries at risk or found to experience violent elections are actually ranked top among countries with high earning politicians, yet, the correlation between high official earning and fierce contest is not strong enough for an outright assertion. Again, as I would be discussing later in the work, I also observed that the stakes (resources invested in contesting elections) in most of the countries at risk of electoral violence sometimes supersede what is officially accruable to the eventual winner during his/her lifetime in office.

At this stage, I reflect on the gains of politics further to include those untold, off-record, unofficial, non-monetary and illegal benefits gained as a product of the possession of authority, hence, unbridled ‘*access*’ to state resources. Here, I consider “access” as the ability to benefit from things - including material objects, persons, institutions, and symbols. In this work, I clarify that access defers from property in that access focuses on *ability* rather than *right*.

Although, the *theory of access* as largely developed by Ribot and Peluso (2003) has been frequently used by property and natural resources analysts, with little or no significant adoption in the social sciences. The theory generally examines a broad set of factors that are viewed heuristically as strands that constitute and configure webs of access. The theory intends to enable scholars and others to map dynamic processes and relationships of access to resources. The concept of access that is presented here aims to facilitate grounded analyses of who essentially benefits from things and through what processes they can do so (Ribot and Peluso, 2003). Access retains an empirical “focus on the issues of *who* does (and who does not) get to use *what*, in *what ways*, and *when* (that is, in what circumstances)” (Neale

1998:48). “Use” according to this theory can be seen to mean the enjoyment of some kind of benefit or benefit stream (Hunt 1998).

However, people and institutions are positioned differently in relation to resources at various historical moments and geographical scales. The strands thus shift and change over time, changing the nature of power and forms of access to resources. Some people and institutions control resource access while others must maintain their access *through* those who have control (hence, decamping, cross-carpeting and other forms of migration from one party to another, and other forms of realignment with political lords). Access analysis also helps us understand *why* some people or institutions benefit from resources, *whether or not* they have rights to them. This is a primary difference between analyses of access and property. If the study of property is concerned with understanding claims, particularly the claims that MacPherson (1978) defines as rights, then “the study of access is concerned with understanding the multiplicity of ways people derive benefits from resources, including, but not limited to, property relations” (Ribot and Peluso, 2003).

Considering the analyses of ‘access’ above, it is a clear notion that while official emoluments and other legal entitlements can be categorized as ‘property’ (as in those benefits acquired based on rights), every other benefit which transcends claims or rights (based on ability) can be regarded as ‘access’. Access in this sense is about all possible means by which a person can benefit from things, while property generally evokes some kind of socially acknowledged and supported claims or rights

Nevertheless, in some cases, access (ability to benefit) can be used to further create properties, which would afterward be benefitted as claims/rights. These benefits are mostly legalized and made formal as a product of the possession of state power. This becomes evident in cases of legislation for

jumbo pay, provision for immunity, salary for life, hefty retirement packages among other cases. For instance in Nigeria, though ostensibly legal, federal legislators' excessive salaries, allowances, and other benefits - amounting to \$540,000 per lawmaker in 2017 - are also seen by many Nigerians as akin to corruption. Top officials also receive generous retirement packages (Page, 2018). Another case that easily comes to mind is the crisis between the incumbent governor of Zamfara and his predecessor, relating to the stoppage in the payment of pension and other allowances for former governors and their deputies. The former governor, Abdul'aziz Yari had assented to a bill in March 2019 (barely 2months to the end of his tenure) legitimizing the payment of bogus pension and other outrageous allowances, which according to records amount to over N700million annually (Maishanu, 2019).

Beyond Zamfara, other states in Nigeria have also previously legislated for hefty severance packages for ex-governors and their deputies. In line with the foregoing, a January 2017 report calculated that "over N37.36 billion was expended on servicing 47 former governors in 21 of the nation's states as pension payments and provision of houses, staff, and motor vehicles replaceable between three and four years" (The Guardian, 2019).

In preparation for elections, 'accesses to resources differs among political parties and candidates, and as such shapes political competition and influences the balance of power between parties. Candidates that are well funded are likely to defeat opponents who have less money. The amount of money in a candidate's war chest can determine victory or defeat (Weeks, 2008). For example, where a party in government has access to administrative resources, the opposition parties need more money to compensate for their disadvantage. This access overly includes public subsidies, which can take a variety of forms, including tax breaks, free access to public services including airtime, access to public buildings, provision of

goods and allocation of financial resources. All of these no doubt have a considerable impact on political competition.

In another case, Speck & Olabe (2013) argued that elected officeholders use their influence on civil service to arrange for donors, who in the long run earn contracts, get access to public loans or earn other benefits. This involves undue political influence on public service and unlawful behaviour of public servants involved in public procurement, licensing, permissions or other areas where companies expect illegal favours in return for campaign donations.

The foreseeable ‘access’ to tangible and intangible benefits consequently gives rise and encourages clientelistic exchanges. These clientelistic exchanges just as Berenschot (2018) suggested, involve the practice of exchanging a targeted, non-policy-based provision of money and state resources (jobs, public services, government contracts, etc.) for political support (such as votes, campaign funding, and campaign support).

With the foregoing, political offices thereby provide winners the opportunity to gain ‘access’ to political power, state resources (tangible and intangible), patronage, immunity against investigation (especially executives) to mention a few. Consequently, considering the predictable ‘access’ to these benefits, elective positions thereby provoke intense competition among political parties and candidates, as well as intense use of resources in ensuring victory.

Examining the notion of ‘Access’ in Corrupt Systems: the Nigerian Example

The political and economic opportunities available in different political systems, as well as the strength and effectiveness of state, social and economic institutions, shape the conditions and extent to which individuals and groups utilize ‘access’. While many developed societies boast of strong systems capable of mitigating the challenges of misuse of this ‘access’,

societies with weak systems are bedevilled by events of leakages caused by the weak separation of the public and private spheres, which results in the widespread private appropriation of public resources and benefits.

In this context, one word that best captures the description of the relationship between public power and personal gain is ‘corruption’. This is because, in its simplest form, corruption can be seen as the “misuse of public power for private or political gain.” The notion of “misuse” here is sacrosanct in defining what a corrupt act is, and as such re-establishes the place of ‘access’.

Over time, public offices have served as a virile platform for the advancement of corruption in Nigeria, as corruption in the country appears to be ubiquitous and takes many forms: from massive contract fraud to petty bribery; from straight-up embezzlement to complicated money laundering schemes; from pocketing the salaries of non-existent workers to steering plum jobs to relatives and friends. The enormity of this prompted Page (2018) to identify twenty-eight corruption tactics in eight behavioural categories that cut across sectors.

In Nigeria, there are myriad of cases relating to how elected public officials illegally amass wealth, and through several means and strategies. It was therefore not surprising in 2006 when Nuhu Ribadu (a former anti-corruption warlord) famously told the Senate that the EFCC was investigating 31 of the 36 state governors for graft and declared the names of some of the governors who would be prosecuted after they left office (*THISDAY*, 2006).

Among the most pronounced cases were those of former Governor of Bayelsa State, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, who was arrested in September 2005 by British authorities in London. The London Metropolitan Police found about £1 million in cash at his home and charged him with money laundering. Later they found a total of £1.8m (\$3.2m) in cash and bank accounts. He was found to own four homes in London worth an alleged £10

million (*Fitzgibbon, 2016*). Meanwhile, his state's monthly federal allocation in six years (of his reign) has been in the order of £32 million. Released on bail, Alamieyeseigha managed to flee the UK - reports say he disguised as a woman - and reappeared in his home state, claiming he had been transported there by God (*Polgreen, 2005*). As a sitting governor, he enjoyed immunity from prosecution in Nigeria, but three months later, he was impeached by his state legislature, and the EFCC charged him with embezzling about \$55 million in public funds (*Ahemba, 2005*).

Similarly, in December 2007, the EFCC stunned Nigeria by arresting James Ibori, the powerful former governor of Delta State, in the oil-rich Niger Delta. On 27 February 2012, accused of stealing US\$250 million from the Nigerian public purse, Ibori pleaded guilty to ten counts of money laundering and conspiracy to defraud at Southwark Crown Court, London. Again, former Edo State governor, Lucky Igbinedion was charged by EFCC prosecutors in January 2008 with siphoning off more than \$25 million of public funds, which he pleaded guilty to as well.

It is a culmination of these cases among others that birthed the assertion by the Attorney General and Minister of Justice Abubakar Malami that “from 2000 to 2013, over US 7 trillion in illicit flows from corruption and embezzlement transited the country” (*Nnochiri 2016*).

Most of these monies are never directly transferred or flown into their private accounts, rather such monies are stated for some purposes which they are never utilized for such rather than for phantom projects, contracts, and interventions. Just like what happened under Gen. Sani Abacha administration when large amounts were taken out of the CBN under the guise of financing ECOMOG, the West African peace-keeping force. Lots of these funds are raised and tagged for public use, which are afterward diverted for personal use.

Another major scandal, which stands out as an apposite illustration of how public office holders access public funds and resources, which are eventually syphoned and utilized for private gains, is the case of a former National Security Adviser, Sambo Dasuki who faces prosecution over a \$2 billion arms fraud. Preliminary investigation suggested that about \$2 billion was disbursed for the procurement of arms to fight against Islamic insurgency in Nigeria, but was however diverted for the sponsoring of the re-election of Goodluck Jonathan, the former President of Nigeria. Reports showed how this money was distributed among party chieftains and loyalists of the PDP in preparation for the 2015 presidential election (Premium Time, 2015; The Nation, 2015; Vanguard News, 2015).

The Stakes

In Nigeria, the 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) specified in section 225 (1-6) conditions and scrutiny of the sources of funds and expenses of political parties. Section 225 (3) (a) and (b) as well as 225 (4) forbid political parties from foreign funding of any kind. Section 226 (1-3) demands annual reports of accounts from political parties. More so, the Electoral Act (2010) stipulates the upper limit of expenses by candidates and political parties for specific elective positions. The maximum limits are pegged at: N1,000,000,000 (naira) for presidential candidates, N200,000,000 for governorship candidates, and N40,000,000 and N20,000,000 respectively for Senate and House of Representatives candidates.

In Nigeria, in preparation for 2019 general elections, political parties in the country announced procedures of how party aspirants would obtain the various party forms. According to details released by the All Progressive Congress (the country's ruling party), the cost of the nomination and expression of interest forms for the office of the President is N45m. Those seeking the party's nod to contest the Governorship seat will pay N22.5m,

while aspirants to the Senate and House of Representatives seats were asked to pay N7m and N3.850m respectively and State House of Assembly N850,000.

On the other hand, the Peoples’ Democratic Party (a major opposition party) announced that presidential aspirants would be charged N12m; Governorship N6m; Senate N4m; House of Representatives N1.5m; and House of Assembly N600,000. For the All Progressive Grand Alliance, presidential aspirants will pay N25m; Governorship N10m; Senate N5m; House of Representatives N2.5m; and State House of Assembly N1m (see table 1 below).

In reality, there is no justification for the high cost of nomination forms, rather, such high cost is meant to strategically serve as hindrance to financially lightweight aspirants.

Table 1; Cost of Party Forms for the 2019 General Election

Office	APC			PDP			APGA		
	Expression of Interest Form	Nomination Form	Total	Expression of Interest Form	Nomination Form	Total	Expression of Interest Form	Nomination Form	Total
Presidential	N5 million	N40 million	N45 million	N2 million	N10 million	N12 million	N5 million	N20 million	N25 million
Governorship	N2.5 million	N20 million	N22.5 million	N1 million	N5 million	N6 million	N2 million	N8 million	N10 million

Senate	N1 millio n	N6 millio n	N7 millio n	N500, 000	N3.5 millio n	N4 millio n	N1 million	N4 millio n	N5 millio n
House of Rep	N350, 000	N3.5 millio n	N3.85 millio n	N500, 000	N1 millio n	N1.5 millio n	N500,0 00	N2 millio n	N2.5 millio n
House of Assembl y	N100, 000	N750, 000	N850, 000	N100, 000	N500, 000	N600, 000	N200,0 00	N800, 000	N1 millio n

Source; Ayitogo (2018); Ezea (2018);

It must be said that Nigeria (just like many other African democracies) faces formidable obstacles ahead if our politics continues to be driven by “cash-and-carry” politicians. A level playing field for all political aspirants is what sustains democracies around the world. Political offices are duties to be done, not prizes to be won by those who can afford the highest asking price. Among the very huge implications this would have on sustainable democracy is that the young aspiring candidates would not afford to contest without the negotiations and support godfathers who are readily available to provide the resources needed and recouped in multiple folds.

Moreover, purchasing the interest and nomination forms is not final, as aspirants would have to jostle for the party final tickets. In most of the popular parties, there are reports of how delegates are been bought over and huge monies expended to secure their votes. Again, vote buying has emerged as a big threat to credible elections in Nigeria. Oftentimes, this brazen attempt to sway voters’ choice by offering them incentives have come in several styles and nomenclatures. For instance, Olorunmola (2016) noted a former Governor of Ekiti State, when questioned on his decision to share food items and meals on an election day, he regarded the act as a kind gesture targeted at addressing the “stomach infrastructure” of the voters.

Having invested huge funds, candidates and their supporters have only one mindset: to win the election and win at all costs. Most importantly, in a winner takes all situation, there are huge threats and fears of losing. The candidates and sponsors are not prepared to lose the huge resources invested in the process. Therefore, elections become prone to violence, fraudulent practices and all forms of irregularity. They explore every available means, including violence, intimidation and vote buying, as well as rigging to ensure victory. Most electors stay away from voting to keep safe, consequently, amounting to low voter turnout. In such a scenario, the outcome of elections hardly reflects the wishes of the electorates. Election credibility becomes a difficult objective to attain no matter the professional competence of the Election Management Body

Conclusion

This work attempts to provide alternative explanations to why many elections spark violence. While the arguments and assumptions in the work might not be universally applicable, it however, appears resilient in explaining the prevailing nature of election violence in most African countries and other developing democracies. There is absolutely the need for more rigorous empirical examination especially for country-specific case studies, as this work stimulates new frontiers in the discourse, analyses, and understanding of the attitudinal dimensions of electoral violence in Africa.

Although in Africa, there seems to be an avalanche of problems impeding her development, however, violence, corruption, ethnic and religious bigotry top these issues. It is to this end that this work made frantic efforts to create links between political corruption, high stakes in elections and electoral violence.

In line with series of recommendations that have been previously made in other studies, charters, election observation reports as solutions proffered to

mitigate the menace of electoral violence in Africa, this study holds that there is the need for institutional strengthening to reduce leakages and promote transparency in governance. The work holds that the presence of leakages in the governance and the absence of transparency cumulatively engender higher gains in politics, thus making politics a very lucrative business in the society.

It is therefore suggested that political offices be made less attractive (as politics is viewed as investment upon which the investors will expect to recoup both his capital and interest) by ensuring that the gains of winning elections, and the disadvantages of losing them are drastically reduced to avoid the violence that a winner-takes-all situation can generate.

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Money Politics and conduct of credible Election in Nigeria: a case study of Kano State 2015 Gubernatorial Election

Dalhat Muhammad Auwal

Abstract

One of the challenges of conducting free, fair and credible election in Nigeria has been recognized to be excessive monetization of politics. Due to the use of money, elections were not uncredible but the beneficiaries of these fraudulent elections fail to recognize the people as the main focus of democracy. It is on this premise that this study was designed to investigate the nexus between money politics and conduct of credible election in Nigeria the 2015 gubernatorial election in Kano State as a reference case. Using documentary content analysis as methodology and elite theory of clientelism and prebendalism as theoretical framework of analysis, the study revealed that money politics and credible election have serious relationship in Kano State political arena. It is imperative to note that the implications discussed are by no means exhaustible but they are by all means clear analysis of the Nigerian experience, but in this case, 2015 gubernatorial election in Kano State. The study therefore concluded that money plays important role in the electoral process in Kano State. It was recommended that the electoral and other institutional reforms should be effective. Anti-corruption agencies should collaborate with banks and other financial institutions to monitor the movement of cash during elections. Also essential, is a culture of democratic citizenship that begins with a citizenry ready to insist on credible and transparent elections. Voters should be sensitized to imbibe moral objections to money politics.

Keywords: *Politics, Election, Godfatherism, Money Politics, General Election, Credible Election, Electoral Act and INEC.*

Background of the Study

Money has become a dominant factor in African politics. Money seems to have taken the centre stage in the political process in most countries and in the Nigerian politics in particular. It is, sadly, now playing an increasingly

critical role. It even appears to be so dominant in the electoral process to such an extent that the word 'money politics' with a pejorative connotation, has crept into the country's political lexicon. It is now a critical variable when assessing the level of political corruption in the country. Many Scholars such as (Davies, 2005, Walecki 2006, Saliu 2008, Schedler 2005, Ojo 2006) cited in Kwaghga and Tarfa (2015) have written on money politics and vote buying in Nigerian politics because of the devastating impact of the phenomenon on the body politics. Money politics can be defined as the phenomenon in the Nigerian electoral process whereby contenders for elective positions use money or money is used on their behalf as an inducement to mobilize and get the support of the electorates which is not based on persuading the electorates to vote according to their wish and conviction but on the force of money that has changed hands. Related to this, is outright vote-buying. Vote-buying in its literal sense, is a simple economic exchange (Owasa, 2013) cited in Kwaghga and Tarfa (2015).

According to (Adetula 2008), money politics is shrinking the political space, and becoming a key variable in determining who participates in electoral politics and how. For example, nomination fees for party members seeking elective positions have become so high that only the rich and daring political entrepreneurs can participate in party primaries (IFES Survey 2007:xxviii). Adetula also asserted that in 1992, for example, presidential hopefuls spent over one billion naira during the primaries while other not-so-rich contenders had about 120 million naira as a budget for primaries. Today, money drawn votes and voices in Nigeria as godfathers' openly confess about shady deals, funding or sponsoring elections for 'godsons' and purchasing electoral victory. Businessmen and women are not left out in this illegitimate and illicit use of money for political influence. In an interview, in 1999 General T.Y Danjuma admitted, I helped to finance his (President Olusegun Obasanjo) first term election. I raised \$7 million. Slightly more than half of

it came from my business associates. General Danjuma also added, Not once did he (Obasanjo) find out from me where this money came from. Was it from me, from my business associates, whether I stole it or whatever he didn't ask me! (Adetula, 2008: xxviii) There are many such as the aforementioned in the political writing of Nigeria and on the conscience of many political merchants (Adetula, 2008). This worrisome development, has in no measure, complicated the electoral and democratic process in Nigeria.

Literature Review

The Meaning and Forms of Money Politics

Money politics can be defined as the phenomenon in the electoral process whereby contenders for elective positions use money as an inducement to get electorate's support which is not based on persuading the electorates to vote according to their wish and conviction but on the force of money that has changed hands. Related to this, is outright vote-buying. Vote buying in its literal sense, is a simple economic exchange (Kwaghga and Tarfa 2015). According to Charles and Schedler, (2005) cited in Beetseh, and Tarfa (2015) candidates buy and citizens/electorates sell vote, as they buy and sell apples, shoes or television sets. The act of vote-buying by this view is a contract or perhaps an auction in which voters sell their votes to the highest bidder. Parties and candidates buy vote by offering particularistic material benefits to voters.

According Callahan (2000) money politics, as a practice which rests upon pay offs that are not directly and explicitly tied to reciprocity in the polling booth, is sometimes referred to as indirect vote-buying. This practice, according to him, was well known in 19th century England and early 20th century in France and is common today in the Philippines and in the squatter settlements of Quito, Ecuador. He further stated that, In Taiwan, vote brokers typically approach relatives, friends and neighbors. A similar tactics is also

employed in Thailand. For example, in the 1992 election in Thailand campaign workers for one candidate sought in each village to recruit the person best placed to deliver support, generally someone with significant social status in the village. (pg 66) Other qualifications include: being respectable, well known, a local leader (either official or unofficial), the candidate's relative or close friends, or some other characteristics that would make people honour their vote promises (Callahan, 2000 cited in Kwaghga, and Tarfa 2015).

Money politics in Nigeria will be better understood if situated within the context of the nature of the political economy of the country. The Nigerian state plays a dominant role in the national economy in the face of the underdevelopment of private capitalist enterprise. This throws up the state as a primary instrument of accumulation. As a facilitator of the capitalist development process, the Nigerian state is a major owner of the means of production. Buoyed by the expanded oil revenues of the early 1970s, the state effectively dominated all aspects of the national political economy (Jega, 2000:30 cited in *Daily Trust* 2011). President Babangida alleged irregularities and other acts of bad conduct against the presidential candidates in the 1993 national elections. He said: There were proofs as well as documented evidence of widespread use of money during the party primaries as well as the presidential election (Babangida, 1993 cited in Adetula, 2015:5). He went further to say that: Evidence available to government put the total amount of money spent by the presidential candidates as over two billion, one hundred million naira (N2.1 billion).

Wilhelm (2013:1) argued that Money is ubiquitous in politics. Election campaigns, political parties, interest groups, nonprofit organizations and the media depend heavily on money, or more broadly speaking on material resources. They are all organizing collective action and reaching out to voters, journalists or politicians depends on funding for staff and rent to run

offices or for communication services to reach out to citizens. According to Wright (1985) cited in Lucky (2013) the use of money to buy votes does not even stop at election time. It is a common practice in Nigeria as it is in many other countries, for numerous private interest groups and political action Committees which seek policy goals and legislations to serve their small private.

The Implication of Money Politics on Credible Election and Democratic Governance in Nigeria

Money has become a dominant factor in the Nigerian electoral process. Political parties and candidates in their minds believe that money is the major player during campaigns and election. They believe that party manifestos and the integrity of the candidates seeking their votes are no longer in existence because all of them cannot be guaranteed. However, candidates resort to vote buying or money politics. Many of the electorate has been increasingly exhibiting cynical electoral behavior to sell their vote to the highest bidder. This practice constitutes a blemish danger to the democratic process of electing public officers which prevents goods governance and credible election because the voters sell out their votes to the highest bidder not the good candidates or party with good manifestoes and integrity. Although it may be difficult to eliminate the phenomenon of money politics, because political parties and campaigns cannot take place without money in the sphere politics.

Money Politics and vote-buying has made election results to have little or nothing to do with the performance in office of politicians. Precisely because performance is not a critical factor in electoral outcome, the incentive to perform is very weak, and since vote-buying is very effective in achieving electoral victory the resort to it is very high. Consequently, elected public office holders who spent huge sums of money to secure victory at the polls would usually have a greater propensity to pursue their private business and

financial interest and sometimes those of their corporate sponsors or mentors and financiers, euphemistically referred to in Nigeria as political god-fathers. In this situation, public interest takes the back seat in the calculation, thus degrading the responsibilities of the elected officials to the people. It is for this reason that the Nigeria National Orientation Agency, a public enlightenment body sponsored a radio and television jingle during political campaigns and rallies by which it warned the electorate to be wary of politicians who want to buy their votes because according to the jingle, anyone who uses “*wuru-wuru*” (crooked, illicit means) to get elected could certainly render “*wuru-wuru*” service to the people (Davies, 2006:79).

Money and violence exert far-reaching influence over electoral politics in Nigeria. Elections in the country have been generally marred by violence ranging from verbal attacks to outright killings. Also, the domination of the political landscape by the godfathers and money bags politicians has further complicated the electoral violence trends in the country. The national elections held in the country since 1999 had their share of violent conflicts and illicit use of money as well as the complicity of the moneybags politicians who equally engaged in the manipulation of ethnicity and religion. Paul Collier’s remark on money and politics in Nigeria is quite revealing. It shows the domination of electoral politics in the country by the moneyed elites. According to him; One reason for the conflict between decent governance and the other options is money....How do you win a Nigerian election for an unknown candidate in only a few months, facing an entrenched opponent? The answer is you probably need a lot of money (Collier, 2009:45 cited in Adetula 2015).

Money politics and vote-buying on good governance is that the winner in the elections when he occupies a public office that gives him access to public fund becomes more prone to corruption. For instance, if he is a legislator, he becomes more prone to receiving gratification to promote and support the

private interest of his sponsors. There is now a popular feeling, indeed thinking, among a coterie of Nigerian politicians, that political contest is a high risk investment opportunity. The higher the risk the greater are the returns. This type of thinking has been corroborated by a former President of the Nigerian Senate, Senator Ken Nnamani when he affirmed in an interview that because votes are not free, politicians considered electoral contest for seats in the National Assembly as an investment and that many of them invest their fortunes, incurred debts and even sold their houses to contest and get elected (*Sunday Punch* June, 5, 2005).

Theoretical Framework

Clientalism and Prebendalism are two theories used to analysis the research work, However the fundamental principles of political organization and behavior in Nigeria. Where an individual will seek the support and protection of his “*Oga*” or his Godfather, while trying to acquire the basic social and material goods-loans scholarships licenses, plots of urban land employments, promotions and the main resource of the patron in meeting these requests is quite literally a piece of the state. Examples can be seen in the appointment of misters or position on government boards. It is also ply to individual in there private sector.

Joseph (1987) also posits that the existence of prebendalised politics and the easy adoption of traditional patron client relationships to the pursuit of modern material goods, means that these two features of the system prebendalism and clientalism are mutually rein enforcing. To obtain and keep clients, one must gain prebendal office. To is to say that an individual or his kin have a reasonable chance of procuring in the distribution of the prebendal office. In Nigerian politics clients are gathered together to make their collective claims as well as to prove the aspirant patron (prebendal office) that there cooption would be rewarded by the political entrepreneurs.

Due to abject poverty and illiteracy among the Nigerians and the somewhat hostile or closed political atmosphere the elites continue to consolidate their stance and determine the formulation and implementation of all public policies which are largely reflective of their interest. For example, in Nigeria as long as a leader enjoys the support of other leaders the agitation of his people is of little consequences. Hence, though people have the right to institute the recall of their elected leaders and in some instances, the suspension of these officials, such process have never yielded the desired result. Money has always been the determining factor consequently, frustrating the exercise of the democratic rights of the people even before it was put to test as enshrined in the country's constitution and electoral act. This was made manifest in the horse-trading that characterized the moves to recall senators such as Senator Waku, Jibril Aminu, Nzeribe and Ibrahim Mantu by the leadership of the party at various levels. Walecki (2003).

The theory can also explain the Feud going on in Kano State between the former governor and incumbent governor, Sen. Rabi'u Musa Kwankwaso and Governor Abdullahi Umar Ganduje. Few months into the administration of Governor Abdullahi Umar Ganduje the feud between the governor and his predecessor and also godfather is threatening governance in the state. The crisis involving the governor's political godfather, Senator Rabi'u Musa Kwankwaso began since the first term inauguration of his political god-son, Governor Abdullahi Ganduje. Among other things, Governor Ganduje is being accused of derailing from the *Kwankwasiyya* political ideology of its leader Senator Rabi'u Kwankwaso by deliberately sidelining all political associates of his boss, abandoning of the controversial 5km road projects in all the 44 Local Governments across the state. He is also accused of turning a blind eye towards the completion of 5.8km fly-over bridges, and forming alliances with the former Minister of Education, Malam Ibrahim Shekarau. The Governor has been accused of deliberately leaking out some vital

documents to political enemies of Kwankwaso who have petitioned EFCC with allegations against him bordering on financial dealings with pensioners funds and other sundry charges.

Methods

Content analysis as a method of investigation was adopted in the study. This involves technique for systematically describing written, spoken or visual communication. It provides a quantitative (numerical) description. Many content analyses involve media-print (newspapers, magazines), television, video, movies, and the internet. The researcher adopted correlational analysis of secondary data sources using descriptive research methodology to view what others have written or said in relation to the topic of study. The research consulted textbooks, journals, magazines, newspaper, online materials, electoral act and other government publications and gazette within reach. The research approach tends to reveal the characteristics of Nigerian politicians and incidences of financial inducement of electorate in the conduct of general elections more specifically in the 2015 gubernatorial election in Kano State.

Findings

Rules and Regulation Guiding Electoral and Political Expenses

In Nigeria, there are various constitutional and other legal instruments guiding the operation of political parties, especially as it relates to campaign financing and vote buying. These include the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended), the 2002 and 2006 Electoral Acts, and 2010 Electoral Act as amended. Others include the statutory rules of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and other informal rules. These laws provide copious provisions of the extent and limitation of political parties with respect to campaign/political financing and vote buying. The 1999 Constitution, for instance, is the first ground-norm

governing the activities of political parties in the country. What is of utmost interest is the limitations placed on political parties especially with respect to their funding activities by the 1999 Constitution.

Section 225 sub section 2 of the 1999 Constitution on the Finances of political parties. It states that: —Every political party shall submit to the Independent National Electoral Commission a detailed annual statement and analysis of its sources of funds and other assets together with a similar statement of its expenditure in such form as the commission may require. Sub sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the same provision are even more forthcoming on the roles of INEC in checking the financial dealings and status of political parties. For instance, sub section 3 states that no political party shall –

- (a) Hold or possess any funds or other assets outside Nigeria; or
- (b) Be entitled to retain any funds or assets remitted or sent to it from outside Nigeria.

Sub-section 4 states that: Any funds or other assets remitted or sent to a political party from outside Nigeria shall be paid over or transferred to the commission within twenty-one days of its receipt with such information as the commission may require. Sub-section 5 further states that:

The Commission shall have power to give directions to political parties regarding the books or records of financial transactions which they shall keep and, to examine all such books and records.

Significantly, section 226 sub-section 1 permits INEC to mandatorily prepare and submit annually to the National Assembly a report of the accounts and balance sheet of every political party. In preparing its report, sub-section 2 of the same provision empowers INEC to: Carry out investigations as will enable it form an opinion as to whether proper books of account and proper records have been kept by any political party, and if

the Commission is of the opinion that proper books and accounts have not been kept by a political party, the Commission shall so report.

These are constitutional instruments aimed at closely monitoring and supervising the activities of the income and expenditure of political parties. There are, however, some gaps, especially in the implementation of these provisions. Looking at the provision of section 228, it is clear that the framers of the 1999 Constitution bestowed on the National Assembly the powers to make laws to provide for the type of punishment that should be imposed on. The 2010 electoral Act as amended does not only grant INEC the power to place a limit on the amount of money or other assets, which an individual or group of persons can contribute to a political party, it also stipulates spending limits to candidates section 90(1). For instance, section 91(2) of the same Act puts the spending limits for Presidential candidates at N1 billion, while candidates for Governorship election are required not to spend more than N200 million [section 91(3)]. Similarly, the maximum elections expenses to be incurred in respect of Senatorial and House of Representatives seat are N40 million and N20 million respectively Section. 91(4) says that —in the case of State Assembly election, the maximum amount of election expenses to be incurred shall be N10 million section 91(5). In the case of a chairmanship election to an Area Council, the maximum amount of election expenses to be incurred shall be ten million naira (N10, 000,000). (Section 91 (6)). In the case of councillorship election to an Area Council, the maximum amount of election expenses to be incurred shall be one million naira (N1, 000, 000). (Section 91 (7)). In determining the total expenditure incurred in relation to the candidature of any person at any election no account shall be taken of:-

(a) any deposit made by the candidate on his/her nomination in compliance with the law ; (b) any expenditure incurred before the notification of the date fixed for the election with respect to services rendered or material supplied

before such notification. (c) Political party expenses in respect of the candidate standing for a particular election. (Section 91 (8))

(9) No individual or other entity shall donate more than one million naira (N1,000,000) to any candidate. (Section 91 (9)). A candidate who knowingly acts in contravention of this section

commits an offence and on conviction shall be liable – (a) in case of presidential election to a maximum fine of N1,000,000.00 or imprisonment of 12 months or both;

(b) in the case of a governorship election to a fine of N800, 000.00 or imprisonment for 9 months or both; (c) in case of senatorial seat election in the National Assembly election to a fine of N600, 000.00 or imprisonment for 6 months or both; (d) in the case of House of Representatives seat election in the National Assembly election to a fine of N500, 000.00 or imprisonment for 5 months or both; (e) in the case of a State House of Assembly election to a fine of N300, 000.00 or 3 months imprisonment or both; (f) in the case of Chairmanship election to a fine of N300, 000.00 or 3 months imprisonment or both; and (g) in the case of Councillorship election to a fine of N100, 000.00 or 1 month imprisonment or both. (Section 91 (10)) Any individual who knowingly acts in contravention of subsection (9) shall on conviction be liable to a maximum fine of N500, 000.00 or 9 months imprisonment or both. (Section 91 (11)) .Any Accountant who falsifies or conspires or aids a candidate to forge or falsify a document relating to his expenditure at an election or receipt or donation for the election or in any way aids and abets the breach of the provision of this section of this Act commits an offence and on conviction is liable to 10 years imprisonment. (Section 91 (11)).

Expenses of Major Parties during the 2015 General Election

There are no reliable sources of the actual amount used in the 2015 General election in Nigeria. Quite often, most of the donations that candidates and political parties received were classified, while it is also difficult to track and quantify those that come in kind. For example, it is difficult to quantify the amount of money expended on media advertorials, which consumes a chunk of campaign finances and that of vote buying. This is largely attributed to the haphazard nature of the political parties. The 2010 Electoral Act (amended) requires political parties not only to

submit their campaign expenses to INEC within six months after an election but shall ensure that same is published in at least two national newspapers [section 92(6)]. In this connection, much of what is available is derived from newspaper reportage. Against this background, the analysis here would be restricted to campaign finances of the two major political parties - the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and the All Progressive Congress (APC), especially as it had to do with the presidential election. For instance, as soon as INEC gave the nod to political parties to commence electioneering activities, candidates commenced the process of raising funds and expending for their campaigns. For instance, the PDP organized a fund raising dinner for its presidential candidate, President Goodluck Jonathan, where it raised more than N22 billion. From just one fund raising dinner, Jonathan breached the maximum limits prescribed by the 2010 Electoral Act.

List of Donors to Goodluck Jonathan 2015 Campaign

S/N	NAMES	AMOUNT
1.	Tunde Ayeni	N1 billion
2.	Tunde and Group of friends	N2.6 billion
3.	Jerry Gana and friends	N5 billion

4.	National Automotive Council	N450 million
5.	PDP Governors Forum (N50 million each x 21 governors)	NN1.05 billion
6.	Bala Shagaya Representing the Oil and Gas sector	N5 billion
7.	Construction Sector	N310 million
8.	Transport and Aviation Sector represented by Didi Ndimou	N1 billion
9.	The Real Estate Sector represented by Oluchi Okoye	N4 billion
10.	Food and Agric Sector represented by Chief Ominife Uzeogbu	N500 million
11.	Cizally Limited	N250 million
12.	Power sector represented by Tunde Ayeni	N500 million
13.	National association of Stevedores	N25 million
14.	Mr. Sam Egwu	N1 million
15.	Halima Jibril	N5 million
16.	Ajuji Best Hotel	N1 million
	TOTAL	N22.442 Billion

Source: *ThisDayLive*, 21st December, 2014

This is aside from the \$2.1 billion that is allegedly used for the election in favour of the PDP. This is being revealed from what is tagged as Dasukigate i.e. Colonel Sambo Dasuki \$2.1 billion arms scandal. The former Security Adviser has given details on how some of the People's Democratic Party (PDP) leaders received slushes funds. He confessed that some former and serving members of the PDP has collected money from his office to ensure

the reelection of President Jonathan. Such PDP figures and the amount allegedly distributed to them include:

S/N	NAMES	AMOUNT
1.	BODE GEORGE	N100M /\$30,000
2.	YERIMA ABDULLAHI	N100M /\$30,000
3.	PETER ODILI	N100M /\$30,000
4.	ATTAHIRU BAFARAWA	N100M /\$30,000
5.	JIM NWOBODO	N100M /\$30,000
6.	AHMADU ALI,	N100M /\$30,000
7.	MAHMUD ALIYU SHINKAFI	N100M /\$30,000
8.	BELLO SARKIN YAKI	N200M
9.	TONY ANENIH	N260M
10.	IYORCHIA AYU’S COMPANY	N345M
11.	BAM PROPERTIES	N300M
12.	DALHATU INVESTMENT LIMITED	N1.5BILLION

Source: *Dailypost* January 8, 2016

The former NSA Colonel Sambo Dasuki, the AIT chairman Raymond Dokpesi, the former Minister of State for Finance, Bashir Yuguda among others are being are prosecuted on the shady deals. The diverted money was meant to be spent on arms procurement to fight the insurgency in the Northeast of the country, but has been revealed, was used to ‘fight’ the 2015 election ‘war’. Dasuki is said to have spent the stolen money on a number of things including re-election campaigns, real estate, —spiritual purposes, as well as payments to a number of public officials.

According to the *Guardian Newspaper* The campaign finances of the APC presidential candidate, Muhammed Buhari are sketchy, but as at January 2015, the Buhari Support Group (BSO) claimed that it raised N54 million from Nigerians in support of his campaign. However, a study of the campaign expenditure of both Jonathan and Buhari indicated that they breached the maximum limits encapsulated in the Act. For instance, a Coalition of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) under the aegis of the Centre for Social Justice (CSJ) in conjunction with United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), raised an alarm over the threats posed to the growth of the Nigerian economy by election spending, contending that there is an inextricable link between election spending and the health of the economy. According to the consortium of CSOs. With attention shifted from governance and a lot of expenditure on campaign, the state of the economy in terms of depreciating exchange, inflation and reduced economic growth rate were bound to occur (*Guardian*, March 12, 2015).

The report put the total amount spent by the two major political parties - PDP and APC on advertisements in the print media alone at N1.382 billion. Specifically, the group said —the total up to February 14, 2015 for the APC presidential candidate is N332.583 million, while the total up to February 14, 2015 for the PDP presidential candidate is N1.049 billion.¶ (*Guardian*, March 12, 2015). The group went further to list other campaign expenses of both candidates to justify the breach of the Act. The PDP spent N1.057 billion on campaign rallies while the APC spent N595.082 million. On bill boards, the PDP expended N155.13 million as against the APCs N99.23 million. Others are electronic media campaign coverage which catted N508.35 million from the PDP and N391.05 million from the APC; while electronic media advert gulped N7.399 million and N5.556 million for the PDP and APC respectively as revealed in table 8. In all the PDP expended

N2.5 billion while the APC spent N1.091 billion. When you add this amount to the expenditure incurred in the print media, you will arrive at a total of N3.882 billion for the PDP and N1.433 billion for the APC. All these are conservative figures since they have not taken into account other expenditures like hotel accommodation, transportation cost (air, sea and road), security, feeding, to mention but a few.

The point being established here is that, both candidates breached the income and expenditure limits set up in the 2010 Electoral Act. Despite spirited efforts by the PDP to cover up for the campaign funds it raised, their expenditure profile clearly shows that the two main political parties flagrantly flouted laid down laws on campaign financing since they both raised and spent more than N1 billion. The donation of N21 billion to the PDP during its fund raising dinner violated Nigeria’s electoral laws. The individuals and groups who donated also breached the Act since it stipulates that neither individuals nor groups/entity may donate more than N1 million. (*Guardian*, March 12, 2015).

Aspects of Campaign Expenditure by Presidential Candidates of the PDP and APC

S/N	EXPENDITURE	PDP	APC
1.	Campaign Rallies	N1.057 billion	N595,082 million
2.	Bill Boards	N155.13 million	N99.23 million
3.	Electronic Media Campaign Coverage	N508.35 million	N391.05 million
4.	Electronic Media Advert	N7.339 million	N5.556 million
	TOTAL	N2.5 billion	N1.091 billion

Source: *Guardian*, March 12, 2015

Conclusion and recommendation

Conclusion

Money politics and godfatherism in Nigeria are in-separable. In fact the amount of influence of godfather to pioneer the activities of godson lies in the ability of former to fancied the political ambition of the later with —*Kayan aiki* (Money). 2015 election which is adjudged to be among fairest is of no doubt the worst ever in term of money-bag politics, as revealed in the study the People’s Democratic Parties the then ruling Party raised almost N22.442 Billion from its financiers, and proceed of arm purchased to the tune of \$2 billion USD (Sambogate) while former Minister of Petroleum Resources, Mrs. Maduke, spent \$1.22 billion to bribe INEC officials, Civil Society organization, Nongovernmental organizations and TMG (which is presently being investigated by EFCC while the opposition All Progressive Congress spent almost half of the PDP expenditure even though there is no reliable data as how much they expended.

In short the study is of the conclusion that money politics will continue to hinder credible election in Nigeria unless a legal, enforceable frame work is put in place to checkmate the menace of excess use of money in vying for political office. Today politics has become business and politicians buy the coveted seat at cost which necessitates them to recoup their initial outlay and reap profit. While the masses continue to complain of non-performance of elected official an eye witness reported to have from the hear former senator of Kano Central Late Kura Muhammad to inform his constituent people that —*Leave my house dan Ubanku* (you are very stupid leave my house) I will not do anything for you because I buy the seat as they threat him with non-re-election, he informed them that, he is not interested in re-contesting and even if he is re-contesting he is going to use his money again.

Recommendations

Based on the finding of this research work I adopted the following recommendations from Walecki (2003) which says, Nigeria can employ different strategies to regulate the use of money in politics and create a framework within which political parties and individual candidates can operate. An effective formula for public control of political money will require the existence of a comprehensive system of political finance based on the following pillars:

- Full disclosure,
- Doctrine of agency,
- Appropriate sanctions,
- Elimination of patronage politics and control over costs of elections,
- Control of donations,
- Effective implementation and enforcement.

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Ethno-Religious Issues and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa:

The Cases of Nigeria and Kenya

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Abstract

Liberal democracy is characterized by main attributes such as periodic and regular competition for political power with the governed as free agents exercising their free and unfettered choice among competing platforms. Elections have undoubtedly become a significant and crucial pillar in the democratic process since they underscore the principles of political participation, accountability and legitimacy. However, democratic transitions in Africa are historically more complex than in other parts of the world. Specifically, the intersection of politics with ethnicity and religion are perhaps major factors in this regard. For instance, the conduct of elections in plural societies like Nigeria and Kenya are often fraught with animosities and violence. At the core of this bitter contest is the struggle for power by factional elite groups perceived as representing ethno-religious and regional interest. The countries' electoral history is replete with narratives of flawed and disputed elections that have turned violent, resulting in numerous fatalities and reversing previous attempts at democratic consolidation. This paper therefore examines the influence of ethnicity and religion on the electoral process in Nigeria and Kenya. It engages the issues or factors that make elections conduct in both countries to be violent prone and undermine attempts at institutionalizing a stable democratic tradition. The paper employs the qualitative and content analysis approach by relying on secondary data from books, journal articles and newspaper commentaries. It affirms that ethnicity and religion play a major role in the elections of both countries and concludes with practicable recommendations.

Introduction

Nigeria and Kenya are two of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa facing the greatest problems of politicization of religion and ethnicization of politics that impede socio-economic and political development in the countries. Kenya is a secular, multicultural, and multiethnic state like Nigeria. No doubt, ethnicity and religion in particular are key variables in the politics and governance of both countries. Elections in most African multicultural societies like Kenya and Nigeria are often characterized by violence in various forms, especially electoral violence all of which often threaten their institutionalization of a stable democratic tradition. Indeed, data suggests that over three-quarters of conflicts in the region are coded as either ethnic or religious (Sambanis, 2001). According to McCauley (2016), political divisions in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the context of civil conflict, often follow either ethno-linguistic or religious lines. This has become worrisome. For instance, electoral violence in Nigeria takes on an ethnic label in some instances and a religious one in others. Similarly, Moywaywa (2018) opine that the need for peaceful cohabitation of all Kenyans despite their ethnic and religious backgrounds is a subject that dominates not only conference proceedings but also religious sermons throughout the country. It has been contended that Nigeria and Kenya have constituted scenes of repeated electoral violence and indeed, the regularity with which electoral violence occurs in many areas of the countries suggests that underlying grievances or structural characteristics may be tied to the elections and fuel the violence (Bekoe, 2010).

Africa's post-colonial history is replete with the quest toward national integration in the face of socio-economic and political challenges and, as argued, one of these challenges is democratic sustainability (Schraeder,

2004; Thomson, 2004,). Accordingly, provided there are strong institutions, one of the vital elements and foundation of any democracy is periodic election. However, despite different reforms and in some occasion military interventions, the electoral processes in Africa on the average have been characterized by various activities that have marred its credibility; one of such activity is electoral violence (Bayart, 1993). The greatest obstacle to the nascent democracy is the pervasive insecurity of lives and property, as evidenced by the spate of ethnic and religious conflicts (Ojo, 2010). Election is viewed as fundamental to democracy. It follows that electoral process is expected to contribute towards democratic consolidation in any given society. The electorates have the civic opportunity to vote for the candidates and parties that will represent their varying interests via elections. However, in many African countries such as Nigeria, the electoral process has brought about unwarranted political instability (Olowojolu et al, 2019).

The point is that since the 1990s many African autocracies have engaged in various efforts towards democratization, Nigeria and Kenya not being the exceptions. The expectation is that these institutional efforts would improve economic performance and reduce proneness to political violence (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Carothers, 2007; Soudriette & Pilon, 2007). However, with a few exceptions the record of African elections so far has raised serious arguments that in ethnically divided societies, competitive electoral processes could in fact be destabilizing by widening existing divisions and deepening divisions between winners and losers (Wilkinson, 2004; Mansfield & Snyder, 2005; Eiffert et al, 2007). Elections in poor African countries such as Kenya and Nigeria have seemingly increased proneness to various manifestations of violence (Collier & Rohner, 2008). There are several likely reasons for the frequent failure of African elections such as ethno-religious intolerance. Onuoha and Ufomba (2017) have posited that like ethnicity, religious polarization plays a key role in electoral violence in

Africa emphasizing that the population of the continent is divided between three main religions; Islam, Christianity and African Traditional Religions (ATR). For instance, politicians have the tendency to use ethnicity in drawing support from their locality, while using religion to bolster support from those who may not be under their ethnic influence but who uphold similar religious conviction and affiliation. Different authors have argued that this power politics along ethno-religious lines can be identified as having ripple effects on the democratic system since it create and sustain political tension and ultimately electoral violence (Egwu 2001; Jega 2002; Osinubi & Osinubi 2006; Salawu 2010).

African political systems possess multiple lines of potentially ethnic cleavage that can be easily mobilized, especially during electoral process. Communal identities in Africa take many forms though all can be ordinarily lumped under the term “ethnic”. For instance, people may identify themselves in religious terms, by language, on the basis of tribal affiliation, clan membership, geographic region of origin, or race. Even though election outcomes have been influenced by religious convictions and mobilization, ethnicity is one of the other major factors that affect outcomes of elections in both countries. Although the federal government of Nigeria, for instance, often stresses the need for the citizens to put national interest above ethnic and religious considerations, ethnicity and religion continue to have considerable influence on the voting patterns of the Nigerian electorates. The purpose of this paper is to assess the influence of ethnicity and religion on the electoral process in Nigeria and Kenya and determine if ethnicity and religion play a major role in the elections of both countries based on qualitative and content analysis method.

Conceptual discourse

Elections are vital to a genuine democratic system. Election is defined as a process through which the people choose their leaders and indicate their

policies and programme preference and consequently invest a government with authority to rule (Osumah & Aghemelo, 2010). Serious incidents of widespread electoral violence take place after election results have been announced while pre-election violence seems to contribute to violence after elections as severe post-election violence is rare without pre-election violence (Straus & Taylor, [2012](#)). Accordingly, election related violence is distinguished from other types of political violence in that it is directly associated with an impending electoral contest or an announced electoral result. Previous studies have argued on the risk of electoral violence as associated with the degree of competitiveness between political actors, weak institutions, and a gradual loss of the state's monopoly of legitimate force (Laakso, [2007](#); Höglund, [2009](#); Mueller, [2011](#)).

According to Fischer (2002), electoral violence is any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, discrimination, physical assault, forced-protection, blackmail, destruction of property or assassination (Fischer 2002). In their opinion, Birch and Muchlinski (2018) understand electoral violence as coercive force, directed towards electoral actors and/or objects, that occurs in the context of electoral competition – can occur before, during or after elections and it can target a variety of actors, including candidates, activists, poll workers, election observers, journalists and voters. In a related view, Ogunديya and Baba (2005) conceive electoral violence as all sorts of riots, demonstrations, party clashes, political assassinations, looting, arson, thuggery, kidnapping spontaneous or not, which occur before, during and after elections. For Albert (2007), electoral violence involves all forms of organized acts of threats aimed at intimidating, harming, blackmailing a political stakeholder or opponent before, during and after an election with an intention to determine, delay or influence a political process. Similarly and comprehensively, Igbuzor (2010) indicates that electoral

violence is any act of violence perpetuated in the course of political activities including, pre, during and post election periods, and may include any of the following acts: thuggery, use of force to disrupt political meetings or voting at polling stations, or the use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters and other electoral process or to cause bodily harm or injury to any person connected with electoral processes.

Theoretical framework

This paper relies on ethno-religious dynamics theory as established by Fox ((1999) and elite theory. It has been argued that religion is an important factor in a conflict although it has the ethnicity aspects as a whole (Fox, 1999). The point is that the concept of ethnicity is susceptible to changes over time, especially through assimilation and differentiation. Fox (1999) therefore believes that religion is not merely an ethnicity aspect, but that religion is an independent factor that contributes to the ethnic identity. Osaghae and Suberu (2005) have submitted that different religions can be an integral part of ethnic differentiation while Salawu (2010) notes that an ethno-religious conflict is different from other types of social conflict because it involves various ethnic groups practicing different religions. Ethnic differences and religious differences are viewed as the determining factors of identity. In relation to Nigeria and Kenya, the term ethno-religious conflict is used to refer to a conflict between ethnic identity and religious identity. But, identity may not automatically trigger conflicts. For instance, a conflict breaks out because of a mobilization process of ethno-religious identity by the elite and it is not the identities that are involved in the conflict (Klinken, 2007). It has also been suggested that ethnicity and religions do not cause conflict but they are used to mobilize support and to justify a conflict that is actually triggered by other factors such as economic and politics (Panggabean in Trijono, 2004).

A theory of ethno-religious conflict dynamics which was established by Fox (1999) is used to describe the role of the elites in the mobilization of ethno-religious identity in Nigeria and Kenya electoral processes. Fox (1999) believes that the ethno-religious dynamics theory is more dynamic, coherent, and scientifically testable as it explains how religions contribute to conflicts. Although other theories are comprehensive, they seemingly fail to construct a dynamic framework. According to Fox (1999), the ethno-religious dynamic theory explains the four basic social functions of religion in that religion as, a meaningful framework for understanding the world; the rules and standard of behaviour that link individual actions and goals to a religious framework; a link between individuals and a greater whole; and an ability to legitimise actions and institutions.

Relationship between ethnicity, religion and electoral violence

Religious polarisation is viewed as an especially important source of conflict (Reynal-Querol, [2002](#)). In relation to ethno-religious mobilisation, expectedly, different types of social networks and their platforms are important for mobilization and such networks will become important in contexts where conflict over who is to control and to benefit from state resources in a specific area is associated with notions of how people are defined in ethnic or religious terms with regard to different localities (Bøås & Dunn, [2013](#)). In order to curb the influence of ethnicity and religion on electoral process, appropriate constitutional mechanisms are established. For instance, the constitution regulates the formation and activities of the parties in an attempt to mitigate ethno-religious mobilisation. In relation to Nigeria, there are provisions for the political parties to be nationalistic in character. For example, the members of the executive committee or other governing body of the political parties seeking for registration shall originate from at least two-thirds of the 36 states of the federation in with the specification in Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, section 223(2)b). Besides,

there is a provision in relation to presidential elections which indicates that apart for securing a majority of the votes, there is a need to obtain at least 25% of the votes in two-thirds of the 36 states, that is, in 24 states. In spite of all these provisions, Joseph (1987) argues that the ‘prebendal’ character of Nigerian politics still makes political representation a question of having ethnicities, religion and regions reflected in power. But rather than having political parties associated with different ethnic or regional camps, the regulations have specified the parties as an arena for these struggles, which has by extension contributed to violence surrounding party primaries (Sisk, [2012](#)).

An overview of ethno-religious issues and electoral violence in Nigeria and Kenya

Although the general presumption has been that ethnic identity is a more prominent and stable source of identity in Nigeria, a substantial number of researchers have demonstrated that religion was more significant than ethnicity as a source of identity and conflict in Nigeria (Ruby & Shah 2007; Pew Research Center 2010; Green 2011). As a fact, religious identity is more pronounced than ethnic identity and only serves to stimulate ethnicity, especially in the Hausa-Fulani North of the country (Osaghae & Suberu 2005). Another argument therefore, is that out of the two major ethnic groupings in the country, the Yoruba are more likely to identify themselves with their ethnic group than are the Northern Hausa-Fulani (Lewis and Bratton 2000; Osaghae and Suberu 2005). The fact that an average Nigerian is very religious has been observed by some sources (Oluduro 2010; Ekundayo 2013). Accordingly, religion plays a critical role in Nigerian society and has expressed itself as a potent force to be reckoned with in the geopolitical development and electoral process of the country. Ironically, this force which has been used to unite Nigerians is the same force that has led to numerous conflicts in the country. For instance, Nigeria has been engulfed

in numerous religious crises and/or conflicts between 1980 and 1994 (Warner, 2012). Ethno-religious conflicts have gained notoriety as the most violent crises in Nigeria due to their tendency to spread into other areas after an early stage in one area. According to Osaghae and Suberu (2005), most of these conflicts used to occur in the middle-belt and along the culturally borderline states of the predominantly Muslim North, and also take place between Hausa-Fulani groups and non-Muslim ethnic groups in the South.

For instance, Kaduna state in Nigeria is divided along ethnic and religious lines with a majority of Hausa-Fulani who are predominantly Muslim in the northern part of the state and a majority of Christians of different ethnicities in the southern part of the state. Since the 1980s, the state has had a history of inter-ethnic communal clashes featuring mobilisation of religious and ethnic sentiments in competition over access to state resources. Before the 2011 post-election violence, there were different episodes of violence in the state, especially in southern Kaduna during confrontations in Kafanchan in the south of the state when an evangelical event was hosted at a college and in 1992, the proposition to introduce a sharia penal code triggered clashes in 2000, and protests in 2002 against the Miss World beauty competition. All these recurrent ethno-religious clashes in Kaduna state alone have deepened segregation of the population along that divide. Most notably, it has affected the pattern of residence in urban areas as Muslims and Christians tend to live in separate areas. This has further affected the structure of social networks as these have become increasingly dependent on religious affiliation.

The announcement of Jonathan as winner of the presidential election triggered street protests and violence in several cities in the north. The protesters alleged massive rigging and irregularities in the election and protests spread through the northern states of Sokoto, Niger, Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Gombe, and Adamawa. Nigeria has witnessed a rising tide of contentious elections ending in heated debates, court challenges, protests and

legitimacy crises. In some instances, these election disputes were settled peacefully through legal means and electoral reforms. In others, they triggered bloodshed, destruction, and undermined the capacity for stable governance, political inclusion, and national integration. For instance, the 2015 general elections in Nigeria were not only the 5th quadrennial since 1999 but the most competitive and divisive in the annals of electoral democracy in the country (Nwangwu et al, 2018). The 2015 and 2019 general elections in the country were also largely characterized by ethno-religious sentiments all of which have seemingly necessitated the government to recently consider the passing of the controversial hate speech bill with death penalty.

Kenya has since the re-introduction of multiparty politics in 1991 experienced periodic electoral conflicts (Wambua, 2017). As a multi-ethnic country like Nigeria, Kenya's pluralist elections are inevitably marked by ethnic undercurrents and strategising. Since the re-birth of pluralist democratic politics in Kenya in 1991, the country once defined as the beacon of peace in Africa has repeatedly suffered electoral conflict (Wambua, 2017). For instances, during the 1992, 1997, 2007, and 2017 general elections, the country experienced electoral violence that led to loss of lives and internal displacement of persons (Oyugi 1997; Akiwumi Commission 1999; Mwagiru 2008; Commission of Inquiry into Post-election Violence [CIPEV] 2008; Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, 2017). Specifically, the identity dimension, most especially the ethnic-identity dimension, is one of the most significant when it comes to analysing electoral conflicts in Kenya (Oyugi 1997; Wamwere 2008). Kenya is composed of forty-four ethnic identities, commonly defined in the derogatory form as 'tribes' (Wambua, 2017).

The tendency to isolate these ethnic groups in analysing electoral conflicts in the country has permeated national discourses on Kenya's conflict

transformation process (Wambua, 2017). The constant ‘ethnification’ of political arguments has taken centre-stage in electoral processes in the country. For instance, the consistent serialisation of electoral contestations using ethnic connotations such as: ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’, ‘ethnic cleavages’, ‘ethnic coalitions’, ‘ethnic manipulation’, ‘ethnic chieftains’, and ‘ethnic chauvinism’, anchors an ethnic perspective that erroneously permeates national dialogues on conflict resolution (Murithi 2009).

Religious identity differences have also permeated Kenya’s ethnic discourse as religious leaders openly enter into political alignments during election periods and there is an emerging tendency for regional and religious arguments to assume ethnic alignments (Wambua, 2017). Besides, there have been regional ethnic identity-based arguments in Kenya’s electoral process. For example, Raila Odinga’s signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with the Muslim community under the National Muslim Leaders Forum in 2007 was a clear attempt to introduce religion-based ethnic divisions in Kenya’s already polarised political scene (Cussac, 2008; Maupeu 2008). These regional- and religious-identity differences are oriented along ethnicity as the prime factor for political alignments.

Elections serve different good purposes such as giving voters the freedom to choose candidates of their choice in order to manage their affairs and affording the candidates the opportunity to canvass for the votes of the eligible voters in a free and fair contest (Obianyo & Emesibe, 2015). It is however a different case, as elections in Africa have been observed as relatively far from achieving these purposes among others. The argument is that they are increasingly contentious and often divide the countries along ethno-religious lines. Specifically, ethnicity and religion have become a key factor in Kenya’s political culture and democratic development. The instrumentalizations of ethnicity and religion as the primary means of mobilization have become an integral part of political life in Kenya. For

instance, the aftermath of most elections in Kenya, particularly the 27 December 2007 general elections, was recorded as dividing the country along ethno-religious lines and left more than 1,300 people dead and nearly 600,000 in Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps (Barkan, 2013; Opondo, 2014). Accordingly, the hotly contested election was mostly between Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU) and Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). Subsequently at this period, Kenya witnessed a level of division and violence never seen before in its electoral history. In a similar development, the August 2017 presidential election contest mainly between Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga further reinforced in-group ethno-regional and clannish cleavages in the country.

Prospects for violence free elections in Kenya and Nigeria

No doubt, ethnic and religious groups' affiliation continues to function as a primary form of identity within both urban and rural environments in Nigeria and Kenya. The violence that characterizes electoral processes in Nigeria and Kenya based on ethno-religious issues notwithstanding; there are prospects for peaceful pre-elections and post-elections in both countries. As a way forward, the public must be educated about what ethnicity, religion and election stand for in order to avoid the negative use of both ethnicity and religion in all walks of life, especially in political activities. According to Wambua (2017), realizing positive peace in a country facing electoral violence like Kenya and Nigeria will require the initiation of several interventions including a focus on how to address historical injustices that were meted out to the local communities during the colonial era, especially injustices surrounding land distribution and geographical structuring in the countries. Also, there is a need to ensure overall structural reforms in the countries, especially in the distribution of the political power resource.

Strengthening of institutional is further seen as of great importance in assuring positive peace in the country. It is believed that institutional failure contributes significantly to the cycle of conflict in the countries because their key institutions have been infiltrated with ethnicity. In another view, although institutional strengthening can assure integrity in electoral processes, enacting and enforcing sound legal regimes would make the countries attain national cohesion and integration. There is also a need to institute measures to counter the culture of violence in the countries via the continuous promotion of nationhood and tolerance and understanding among all ethnic, religious and regional formations in the countries. To ensure violence free elections in both countries now and in the future, ethno-religious sentiments must be discouraged among politicians. Anti-ethnic/religious sentiments bill which is also likened to hate speech bill should be passed into law in Nigeria and Kenya. By this, politicians and religious leaders that sponsor or incite the voters under the umbrella of ethnicity and religion should be either be disqualified or made to face jail terms accordingly. Above all, contemporary technologies have presented innovative tools to enhance election processes, including the use of biometric information to create more accurate voter registers and verification of voters, as well as the use of SMS technology to transmit and collate citizens' observations during election processes. If these technologies and, especially e-voting are genuinely embraced by governments in Sub-Saharan Africa, especially in Nigeria and Kenya with corresponding political will, there is likelihood of hope for peaceful elections.

Conclusion

From the above discussion, it has been demonstrated that ethnicity and religion have had an immense influence on the practice of Nigerian and Kenyan elections from the pre-colonial period to the present, but most prominent in the post-colonial period. For instance, the accusation and

counter-accusation that Muslims and Christians brought against one another is a strong evidence of religious' influence on the elections of both countries. This paper therefore affirms the influence of ethnicity and religion on the electoral process and discusses salient issues that characterize elections conduct in Nigeria and Kenya. Although the paper establishes that ethnicity and religion play a prominent role in the elections of both countries, it indicates prospects for violence free electoral processes of the countries in the future.

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